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by 
Hangsoo Kyung 
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Essay1: The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued new Compliance and 
Disclosure Interpretations (CDI) in 2010, relaxing enforcement of Regulation G and Regulation 
S-K. The nonbinding nature and opaque procedures behind interpretive guidance cast doubt as to 
whether SEC staff interpretations changed a firm’s voluntary disclosure. In this paper, I find that 
firms more frequently disclose non-GAAP earnings after the issuance of new CDI, suggesting 
that nonbinding SEC staff interpretations influence corporate disclosure practice. Compared to 
the pre-CDI period, non-GAAP exclusions are of higher quality in the post-CDI period. The 
exclusion quality of firms who started to disclose non-GAAP earnings in the post-CDI period is 
of higher than that of firm who frequently disclose non-GAAP earnings in both the pre- and post-
CDI periods. These results suggest that relaxed interpretive guidance of non-GAAP regulations 
reduced the cost of non-opportunistic disclosure, resulting in more frequent and higher quality 
non-GAAP earnings disclosures in the post-CDI period. In addition, I find that such a relation 
exists among firms with high corporate board independence. Consistent with higher non-GAAP 
exclusion quality in the post-CDI period, the frequency of exceeding analyst forecasts using 
positive exclusions is lower in the post-CDI period. This paper contributes to the voluntary 
disclosure and regulation literatures by providing empirical evidence that SEC interpretative 
guidance is effective in shaping firms’ disclosure practices, and that relaxed guidance both 




Essay 2: In this paper, I examine the effect of voluntary adoption of clawback provision on non-
GAAP earnings disclosures. The extant literature documents that the voluntary adoption of 
clawback provisions improves financial reporting quality by increasing the costs of misstating 
GAAP earnings. However, managers may respond to perception of reduced discretion over 
GAAP reporting by increasing their reliance on non-GAAP earnings disclosures. I find that 
managers more frequently disclose non-GAAP earnings after the voluntary adoption of clawback 
provisions, relative to a propensity-matched sample of control firms. In addition, I find that the 
quality of non-GAAP earnings exclusions deteriorates after voluntarily adopting clawbacks, 
consistent with a more opportunistic use of non-GAAP reporting. My results extend the growing 
literature on clawback adoption and suggest that the improvement in GAAP reporting quality 
associated with clawbacks may be achieved at the expense of deterioration in the quality of non-
GAAP earnings. This unintended consequence has implications related to the mandatory 
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Does SEC Interpretive Guidance Affect Firm Behavior?  
Evidence from Non-GAAP Earnings Disclosure 
1. Introduction 
U.S. capital markets are based on extensive disclosure regulation and enforcement. While 
recent empirical disclosure literature provides evidence on the costs and benefits of increased 
level of disclosure regulation (Bushee and Leuz 2005; Engel, Hayes and Wang 2007), little is 
known about relaxed disclosure requirements. In 2010, the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s (SEC) Division of Corporate Finance (DCF) issued Compliance and Disclosure 
Interpretations (CDI) to implement the relaxation of current policy guidelines on Regulation G 
and Item 10(e) of Regulation S-K by granting registrants extensive discretion as to how they 
adjust for recurring items in non-GAAP earnings in the documents filed with the SEC. In this 
paper, I examine the effect of relaxed interpretive guidance on the use of non-GAAP disclosure. 
I find the relaxed SEC staff interpretations issued in 2010 regarding non-GAAP financial 
measures changed SEC registrants’ voluntary disclosure practice in two areas. First, the freedom 
allowed firms to expand their disclosure after the issuance of SEC staff interpretation in 2010. 
Second, the expanded disclosure resulted in improved quality of the accounting information. 
In January 2010, the DCF announced new CDIs that included the relaxation of existing 
interpretive guidance issued in 2003 without a formal change in actual regulation.1 The prior 
guidance imposed significant administrative burdens on firms adjusting for recurring items. The 
new interpretations eliminated these administrative burdens and allowed firms to exclude those 
                                                            
1 During the 2009 AICPA National Conference, Ms. Meredith Cross, director of the DCF, expressed concerns that 
many companies were unwilling to disclose non-GAAP financial measures in their filings because of restrictions 




recurring items as long as they do not describe them as non-recurring, infrequent or unusual.2 
More importantly, the new interpretations reflect a relaxation of the staff’s skeptical attitude 
toward the use of non-GAAP financial measures.3 The shift in the SEC staff’s attitude was 
viewed as a significant change that would affect non-GAAP disclosure practice in the earnings 
press release and the SEC filings (Bischoff, Cohen, Davenport, and Trotter 2010). This change in 
interpretation provides a rare opportunity to examine the effect of relaxed regulation on 
registrants’ disclosure practices. 
It is unclear whether relaxed guidance would affect firms’ non-GAAP reporting decisions. 
While relaxed guidance on non-GAAP earnings disclosure is likely to encourage firms to 
disclose non-GAAP earnings more frequently, it is possible that firms might not respond to the 
guidance at all. For instance, Brown, Christensen, Elliott, and Mergenthaler (2012) show that a 
sharp decline in non-GAAP reporting during the period of intense regulatory oversight in 2002 
and early 2003 was followed by a significant increase in non-GAAP reporting from 2003 to 2005 
when there was no change in regulatory action. This suggests that firms might have optimally 
disclosed non-GAAP earnings regardless of regulations on the use of non-GAAP earnings. 
While it is worthwhile examining the effect of interpretative guidance on the frequency of 
non-GAAP disclosure, the more important question is whether relaxed interpretive guidance 
affects the quality of non-GAAP earnings. One might conjecture that the extensive discretion in 
adjusting for recurring items permitted under the new guidance is likely to encourage 
                                                            
2 The prior guidance required public companies to “meet the burden of demonstrating the usefulness of any measure 
that excludes recurring items,” especially for non-GAAP performance measures. This language is omitted in the new 
guidance. It simply states that “the fact that a registrant cannot describe a charge or gain as non-recurring, infrequent 
or unusual, however, does not mean that the registrant cannot adjust for that charge or gain. Registrants can make 
adjustments they believe are appropriate, subject to Regulation G and the other requirements of Item 10(e) of 
Regulation S-K.” (CDI 102.03) 
3 For example, Latham & Watkins LLP stated, “The CDIs reflect a more general relaxation of the staff’s prior, and 
at times somewhat skeptical, attitude toward the use of non-GAAP financial measures, particularly in reports or 




opportunistic non-GAAP disclosure, which may impair the quality of non-GAAP earnings. On 
the other hand, Heflin and Hsu (2008) argue that Regulation G also discouraged firms from using 
non-GAAP earnings to communicate their core or permanent earnings because Regulation G 
imposed significant costs, such as additional administrative burdens, on non-opportunistic non-
GAAP reporters. Relaxed application of regulations on non-GAAP disclosure potentially reduces 
such costs of non-opportunistic non-GAAP reporters, likely resulting in higher quality non-
GAAP earnings. Therefore, it is an empirical question whether relaxed interpretive guidance 
improves or impairs non-GAAP earnings quality. 
To determine whether relaxed interpretive guidance significantly impacts firms’ disclosure 
choices, I examine the relative frequency and quality of non-GAAP earnings. Following Doyle et 
al. (2003), I obtain actual earnings (street earnings) from the Unadjusted I/B/E/S Detail History 
files to proxy for non-GAAP earnings. I identify 67,879 firm-quarter observations from the first 
calendar quarter of 2006 to the fourth calendar quarter of 2011. After controlling for the 
determinants of non-GAAP earnings disclosure such as GAAP earnings informativeness and 
strategic considerations for non-GAAP reporting, I find that the frequency of non-GAAP 
disclosure significantly increases after the issuance of new CDIs, consistent with SEC staff 
interpretation altering SEC registrants’ voluntary disclosure practice.4 It suggests that a relaxed 
interpretation of non-GAAP disclosure regulation encouraged firms to use non-GAAP financial 
measure in the post-CDI period.  
To investigate whether the increase in non-GAAP reporting frequency is motivated by 
managers’ desire to mislead or better inform investors, I examine the effect of interpretive 
                                                            
4 Lougee and Marquardt (2004) find that GAAP earnings are less informative for high-technology firms, rapidly 
growing firms, highly leveraged firms, firms with high earnings volatility, and firms with greater amounts of special 
items. They also find that firms reporting earnings decreases and firms whose GAAP earnings miss the most recent 




guidance on the relative quality of non-GAAP exclusions. Defining a higher quality exclusion as 
being more transitory and having no predictive power for future operating income (Doyle et al., 
2003; Kolev et al., 2008), I find non-GAAP exclusions become more transitory in the post-CDI 
period, which indicates that the quality of non-GAAP exclusions improves after the SEC relaxed 
its interpretations on non-GAAP disclosure regulations. I further investigate the improved quality 
of non-GAAP exclusions by examining the relative quality of exclusions for two groups: (1) 
firms that had not disclosed non-GAAP earnings in the pre-CDI period and started to issue non-
GAAP earnings in the post-CDI period (Starting Reporter) and (2) firms that continuously and 
frequently report non-GAAP earnings in both the pre- and post-CDI periods (Frequent 
Reporter). I find that, in the post-CDI period, the exclusion quality of a Starting Reporter is 
significantly higher than it is for a Frequent Reporter. Moreover, I do not find evidence of an 
exclusion quality difference for a Frequent Reporter between the pre- and post-CDI periods. 
This result suggests that the relaxed new guidance reduced the cost of non-opportunistic non-
GAAP disclosure by eliminating unnecessary language from the prior guidance, thereby 
encouraging firms with informative motives, which were previously discouraged from reporting 
non-GAAP earnings due to high administrative burdens, to now report non-GAAP earnings in 
the post-CDI period.  
In an additional analysis, I find a significantly positive coefficient on other exclusions and an 
insignificant coefficient on special items, suggesting that the improvement in the average quality 
of non-GAAP exclusions is driven by other exclusion quality. I also examine the association 
between exclusion quality improvement and board independence. Frankel, McVay, and Soliman 




exclusions and is a substitute for regulatory scrutiny.5 Consistent with this result, I find the 
positive relation between exclusion quality and future operating income in the post-CDI period 
only for the group of firms with a percentage of independent board members higher than the 
industry mean. This suggests that managerial opportunistic use of non-GAAP exclusions can be 
mitigated in the presence of strong board oversight within a relaxed regulatory environment. 
Finally, I examine whether more frequent non-GAAP disclosure is used to meet or beat analyst 
forecasts. Consistent with higher quality non-GAAP earnings representing reduced opportunism 
on the part of managers, I find that the frequency of meeting or beating analyst forecasts using 
non-GAAP disclosures is lower in the post-CDI period.6  
This paper contributes to voluntary disclosure and disclosure regulation literatures. First, I 
provide evidence that SEC staff interpretations, not actual regulation, effectively regulate 
registrants’ voluntary disclosure practices by showing that the 2010 CDIs significantly increase 
the frequency of non-GAAP disclosure and improve the quality of non-GAAP exclusions. While 
most research examining the SEC’s regulatory impact focuses on regulations which went 
through the regular rulemaking procedure, SEC staff interpretations are not subject to the 
sunshine provision. For example, SEC interpretive guidance is exempt from notice-and-comment 
requirements, therefore lacking the force or effect of law (Fraser 2010). Due to this nonbinding 
nature, it is not clear ex ante whether interpretive guidance changes registrants’ disclosure 
practices. This paper provides the first evidence that nonbinding SEC interpretive guidance 
effectively affects firms’ disclosure practices.  
                                                            
5 Jennings and Marques (2011) provide evidence that investors are also misled by non-GAAP disclosures made by 
firms with weaker corporate governance before Regulation G, indicating the substitution between regulatory 
scrutiny and corporate governance. 
6 In the pre-CDI period, the probability of exceeding analyst forecasts increases by 9.15% when a firm reports 
positive exclusions. This probability, however, decreases by 2.89% in the post-CDI period, consistent with a 
reduction in opportunistic non-GAAP reporting and relaxing excessive regulation on voluntary disclosure enhancing 




Second, my results provide insight into how regulators can shape disclosure regulation using 
interpretive guidance. Even though regulations are not comprehensive, if a regulatory body 
changes its stance on a piece of regulation by issuing interpretive guidance, it may create similar 
legal environments as if there had been a change in actual regulation.  
Finally, this paper provides a useful insight into the consequences of relaxed reporting 
requirements on voluntary disclosure. Bushee and Leuz (2005) show that mandating SEC 
reporting requirements for firms that were to be traded on the OTCBB forced a large number of 
those firms into a less regulated market. Shroff et al. (2013) also show that allowing more 
discretion in freely disclosing information prior to an equity offering is associated with lower 
information asymmetry and a lower cost of equity capital. Similarly, this paper contributes to the 
voluntary disclosure literature by using a unique setting of relaxed reporting requirements and 
provides evidence that these relaxed reporting requirements may improve the quality of 
voluntarily disclosed information. 
Section 2 provides a literature review and institutional background on non-GAAP financial 
measures and Section 3 develops the hypotheses. Section 4 describes the sample selection and 
data description. Section 5 explains the research design and presents the empirical results. 






2. Literature Review and Institutional Background 
2.1 The Costs and Benefits of Disclosure Regulations 
Corporate scandals in early 2000 and the recent financial crisis have caused regulators to call 
for greater transparent financial reporting system, reporting requirements and disclosure 
regulations. Prior literature examines the impact of increased levels of reporting requirements 
and disclosure regulation. While substantial net benefits of mandating SEC reporting 
requirements are documented, it also provides evidence that it imposes significant costs, 
especially on smaller firms, which are likely to avoid registering with the SEC as a result of 
mandating SEC reporting requirements (Bushee and Leuz 2005; Engel, Hayes, and Wang 2007; 
Leuz, Triantis, and Wang 2008; Gao, Wu, and Zimmerman 2009). For instance, Bushee and 
Leuz (2005) examine the costs and benefits of a regulatory change that mandates OTCBB firms 
to comply with SEC reporting requirements, documenting significant costs of the imposing 
disclosure requirements for smaller firms.7 Similarly, Engel et al. (2007) examine public firms’ 
going-private decisions after the passage of SOX. While SOX significantly increased the 
compliance costs, which are considered a fixed component, the benefits of SOX vary across 
firms. As a result, it is argued that net benefits from being public are relatively little for small 
firms. They find that the number of firms carrying out going private transactions increases in the 
post-SOX period. On the other hand, Leuz et al. (2008) investigate causes and economic 
consequences of going-dark decision. 8  They find that increased going dark decisions are 
attributable to SOX, particularly increased compliance costs. The SEC delayed compliance with 
Section 404 of SOX for non-accelerated filers and this bright line size threshold provides 
                                                            
7 They document that the imposition of SEC disclosure regulation force smaller firms with lower outside financing 
needs off the OTCBB. 





incentives for small firms to remain small, which are the unintended consequences of SOX (Gao 
et al. 2009).  
Overall, these studies provide evidence on the cause and effect of increased level of 
disclosure regulation. In general, they document that mandating SEC reporting requirements 
(increased disclosure regulation) impose significant costs on small firms, forcing them into less 
regulated market. While extensive literature on disclosure regulation has been studied regarding 
the increased SEC reporting requirements, less is known for relaxed disclosure requirements 
because it is rare that the SEC relaxes reporting requirements.  
2.2 Non-GAAP Disclosure Literature 
Non-GAAP earnings (also known as pro forma earnings) are alternative earnings measures of 
firm performance. While GAAP earnings are prescribed by Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles, there is no standard for non-GAAP earnings. Firms voluntarily disclose this 
alternative earnings metrics in earnings press release. There are, in general, two views on the 
disclosure of non-GAAP financial measures. First, managers use non-GAAP financial measures 
to communicate firms’ fundamental performances to the extent that GAAP earnings contain 
transitory items.9 Firms with low GAAP earnings informativeness are more likely to disclose pro 
forma earnings, which are more useful to investors in firms with low GAAP earnings 
informativeness (Lougee and Marquardt 2004), consistent with non-GAAP earnings providing 
better information for investors. Similarly, Bradshaw and Sloan (2002) and Bhattacharya et al. 
(2003) provide evidence that non-GAAP earnings are more value-relevant than GAAP earnings.  
A second view is that managers improperly use non-GAAP measures in order to mislead 
investors by excluding recurring items from GAAP earnings. Morgenson (2013) reports in her 
                                                            





recent NY Times article that Twitter aggressively excluded stock compensation, intangible 
amortization or impairment charges to transform its loss into earnings. Consistent with this 
criticism, Lougee and Marquardt (2004) find that firms which report earnings decreases are more 
likely to release non-GAAP earnings than firms which report earnings increases. Items excluded 
from non-GAAP earnings have predictability for future cash flow from operations and stock 
returns, suggesting managers’ opportunistic use of non-GAAP earnings (Doyle et al. 2003). 
Managers’ use of non-GAAP figures to meet or beat earnings benchmarks is suggested in 
Bhattacharya et al. (2004) and Doyle et al. (2013). 
The SEC intervened into non-GAAP reporting in December 2001 by issuing a warning 
regarding the improper use of non-GAAP earnings to obscure GAAP earnings performance, and 
subsequently adopted Regulation G in 2003. Prior research finds a decrease in the frequency of 
non-GAAP disclosure after the passage of Regulation G (Bowen et al., 2005; Entwistle et al., 
2006; Marques 2006; Heflin and Hsu 2008) and a lower frequency of meeting or beating 
earnings benchmarks (Heflin and Hsu 2008). For example, Heflin and Hsu (2008) document that 
the frequency of non-GAAP disclosure and exclusion magnitude have significantly decreased as 
a result of Regulation G, concluding that Regulation G reduced truthful managers’ willingness to 
communicate core earnings through non-GAAP earnings disclosure even though it discouraged 
some managers from opportunistic use of non-GAAP earnings.  
Kolev et al. (2008) examine the effect of Regulation G on the quality of non-GAAP earnings 
exclusions. Defining higher quality non-GAAP exclusions as being more transitory, they regress 
future operating income on an interaction term consisting of a Regulation G indicator variable 
and the magnitude of non-GAAP exclusions. They find a significantly negative coefficient on the 




quality of non-GAAP exclusions by discouraging firms with lower quality non-GAAP 
exclusions in the pre-Regulation G period from releasing non-GAAP earnings. Heflin and Hsu 
(2008) and Kolev et al. (2008) provide evidence that Regulation G has curtailed managers’ 
opportunistic uses of non-GAAP earnings.  
2.3 Compliance and Disclosure Interpretations on Non-GAAP Financial Measures in 2010 
The SEC has expressed its concerns over firms’ improper uses of non-GAAP figures.10 As 
directed by Section 401(b) of SOX, the SEC published a number of rules on the use of non-
GAAP financial measures (Regulation G and Item 10(e) of Regulation S-K). Regulation G 
applies when an SEC registrant publicly discloses non-GAAP financial measures. It requires 
public companies that disclose or release non-GAAP financial measures to show (1) the most 
directly comparable GAAP financial measure along with the non-GAAP measure and (2) a 
reconciliation of the non-GAAP financial measure to the comparable GAAP financial measure. 
In addition, Regulation G prohibits SEC registrants from disclosing a non-GAAP financial 
measure if it contains a material misstatement or it neglects to state a material fact that would be 
necessary to make non-GAAP financial measures not misleading. 
The SEC also amended Item 10(e) of Regulation S-K to impose additional disclosure 
requirements and restrictions when companies include non-GAAP financial measures in their 
SEC filings. Item 10(e) of Regulation S-K requires public companies to (1) present the most 
directly comparable GAAP financial measure with equal or greater prominence, (2) explain why 
management believes the non-GAAP financial measures are useful to investors, and (3) provide 
                                                            
10 In December 2001, the SEC issued a warning with regards to non-GAAP figures, stating that “presentation of 
financial results that is addressed to a limited feature of a company’s overall financial results ... raises particular 
concerns ... To inform investors fully, companies need to describe accurately the controlling principles [and] the 
particular transactions and the kind of transactions that are omitted”. It also states that “a non-GAAP figure would 
not be deemed misleading if the company disclosed in plain English how it deviated from GAAP and the amount of 




a statement of the additional purposes for which management uses the non-GAAP financial 
measures. In addition to these requirements, Item 10(e) prohibits public companies from 
adjusting, eliminating, or smoothing items identified as non-recurring, infrequent, or unusual if it 
is reasonably likely to recur within two years or if a similar charge or gain occurred within the 
previous two years.  
Along with the adoption and the amendment of regulations on non-GAAP financial measures, 
the SEC issued guidance on Regulation G and Regulation S-K in 2003. The guidance includes 
requirements to adjust for recurring items and a prohibition of non-GAAP earnings per share 
measures in the SEC filings. In a 2009 public speech at the AICPA National Conference, SEC 
staff members of the DCF noted that they believed that the previous guidance in the 2003 FAQs 
precluded registrants from providing meaningful information in periodic reports and other SEC 
filings. As a result, the DCF issued new interpretations on the non-GAAP financial measures in 
SEC filings and other public disclosures on January 15, 2010. Wayne Carnall, Chief Accountant 
in the DCF, stated that the new CDIs were issued to accomplish three objectives: “(i) eliminate 
any actual or perceived restrictions in the FAQs on the disclosure of non-GAAP information that 
were not consistent with the actual rules, (ii) clarify the SEC’s interpretations, and (iii) centralize 
in one location the SEC’s interpretations.”  
The primary change in the new CDIs includes eliminating words from Questions 8 and 9 of 
the 2003 FAQs (prior guidance) that discouraged companies from disclosing non-GAAP 
financial measures in their SEC filings. This elimination is viewed as the single most important 
change in the 2010 interpretations. Question 8 of the 2003 FAQs states that: 
“Companies should never use a non-GAAP financial measure in an attempt to 




recurring item, companies must meet the burden of demonstrating the usefulness of 
any measure that excludes recurring items, especially if the non-GAAP financial 
measure is used to evaluate performance.” 
This burden of demonstrating the usefulness of non-GAAP financial measures is perceived as a 
major obstacle that discouraged companies from disclosing non-GAAP earnings in the SEC 
filings (Sandler et al. 2010). 11  For instance, SEC staff members review registrants’ filings that 
contain non-GAAP financial measures. On June 15, 2006, the SEC asked TIBCO Software Inc. 
to provide the SEC with additional information about why they believed a non-GAAP financial 
measure disclosed in the 8-K filings was useful to investors, in compliance with Question 8 of 
the FAQ.12 The new CDIs eliminate this language from the prior guidance and provide more 
discretion to managers when they adjust for recurring items in non-GAAP financial measures. 
This elimination is perceived as a significant change in how SEC staff members view non-GAAP 
financial measures. For instance, PricewaterhouseCoopers stated in its 2011 report that “the 
updated staff guidance will have a significant effect on the way the SEC’s rules are applied by 
companies and interpreted by the SEC staff in the context of non-GAAP performance measures 
that exclude recurring items.” Bischoff et al. (2010) emphasized that “companies will have 
much more flexibility in disclosing non-GAAP financial measures in press releases and SEC 
filings”.  With this elimination, the new guidance clearly states that companies may adjust for 
                                                            
11 The burdens [what burdens?] include that public companies (1) demonstrate the usefulness of any non-GAAP 
financial measure that excluded recurring items, and (2) indicate that inclusion of such measures may be misleading 
without disclosure addressing how and why management used the measures and the material limitations associated 
with their use. In addition to this requirement, companies are not required to limit their use of non-GAAP financial 
measures to the purpose of managing their business only under new CDIs. Item 10(e) of Regulation S-K requires 
registrants to disclose (a) the reasons why management believes that non-GAAP measures are useful to investors 
and (b) the purpose for which management uses the measures. 




recurring items, so long as the recurring items are not labeled as non-recurring. For example, 
Question 102.03 of the new CDIs reads as follows: 
“The prohibition is based on the description of the charge or gain that is being 
adjusted. It would not be appropriate to state that a charge or gain is non-recurring, 
infrequent or unusual unless it meets the specified criteria. The fact that a registrant 
cannot describe a charge or gain as non-recurring, infrequent or unusual, however, 
does not mean that the registrant cannot adjust for that charge or gain. Registrants 
can make adjustments they believe are appropriate, subject to Regulation G and the 
other requirements of Item 10(e) of Regulation S-K.” 
 
The prior guidance also requires that management use the non-GAAP financial measures in 
managing its business. Question 8 of the 2003 FAQs states that: 
“Inclusion of such a measure may be misleading absent the following disclosure:  
• the manner in which management uses the non-GAAP measure to conduct or 
evaluate its business” 
The new CDI question 102.04, however, states that public companies do not have to use the non-
GAAP financial measures in conducting or evaluating their business. 13  Question 102.04 
specifically states that it allows a registrant to use a non-GAAP financial measure that is not used 
by management in managing its business. Also, it says that Item 10(e) of Regulation S-K states 
                                                            
13 CDI 102.04 Question: Is the registrant required to use the non-GAAP measure in managing its business or for 
other purposes in order to be able to disclose it? Answer: No. Item 10(e)(1)(i)(D) of Regulation S-K states only that, 
"[t]o the extent material," there should be a statement disclosing the additional purposes, "if any," for which the 
registrant's management uses the non-GAAP financial measure. There is no prohibition against disclosing a non-




only that “[t]o the extent material, there should be a statement disclosing the additional purpose, 
if any, for which the registrant uses the non-GAAP financial measure.”  
These changes in SEC staff interpretations on non-GAAP financial measures provide a rare 
opportunity to examine the impact of interpretive guidance. It has been difficult to empirically 
examine the effect of interpretive guidance on voluntary disclosure because most interpretive 
guidance (1) is issued immediately after new regulations are adopted, (2) deals with subjects 
whose economic consequences are hard to economically quantify, and/or (3) merely reaffirms 
and rearranges existing guidance in a better format. 14  New CDIs on non-GAAP financial 
measures, however, overcome these difficulties in examining the impact of interpretive guidance 
on voluntary disclosure. 
  
                                                            
14 One example of case (1) is interpretive guidance on non-GAAP financial measures issued in 2003.  One example 
of case (2) is climate change related disclosure requirements issued in 2010, which are difficult to quantify. Finally, 




3. Hypothesis Development 
3.1 The Effect of New CDIs on the Frequency of Non-GAAP Disclosure 
Prior literature finds that regulations on non-GAAP financial measures (Regulation G, 
amendments to item 10(e) of Regulation S-K, and the addition of item 12 to Form 8-K) increased 
costs of both opportunistic and non-opportunistic non-GAAP disclosures (Heflin and Hsu 2008). 
Regulations raised the costs of non-GAAP disclosure by requiring extensive reporting 
requirements. While the regulations provide extensive rules, they did not provide a rule about 
making adjustments for recurring items; therefore, the SEC issued guidance on how to adjust for 
recurring items. Prior guidance mandates that firms disclosing non-GAAP earnings in their SEC 
filings meet the burden of demonstrating the usefulness of non-GAAP financial measures that 
exclude recurring items. This requirement is considered a significant obstacle which discouraged 
firms from disclosing non-GAAP earnings in their SEC filings (Sandler et al. 2010; Bischoff et 
al. 2010). However, new guidance in 2010 eliminated this restrictive language from the prior 
guidance, possibly reducing the costs of non-GAAP disclosure and resulting in more frequent 
non-GAAP disclosure in the post-CDI period. Therefore, firms might start reporting non-GAAP 
earnings more frequently under this relaxed regulatory environment. 
It is also possible that firms do not respond to this relaxed interpretive guidance at all. For 
example, Brown et al. (2012) show that the number of non-GAAP disclosures had temporarily 
declined from 2002 to 2003 due to the passage of SOX and the SEC’s approval of Regulation G, 
but soared up again in 2004 and 2005. This may suggest that firms optimally disclose non-GAAP 
earnings regardless of regulations. This is also consistent with the view that SEC staff members 
issued interpretive guidance to adjust their views on non-GAAP disclosure based on existing 




not respond to the relaxed interpretive guidance since the staff interpretations reflect the current 
disclosure practices, not vice versa. In addition, since the new CDIs in 2010 only include 
changes in interpretive guidance as opposed to changes in actual regulation, it is not clear 
whether firms will have an observable response to them. To date, there has been no such 
evidence documented about how changes in interpretive guidance affect firms’ disclosure 
decisions. 
I therefore make no directional prediction with regards to any changes in the frequency of 
non-GAAP earnings disclosure after the issuance of new CDIs and present the first hypothesis in 
the null form: 
H1: The issuance of new CDIs has no effect on the frequency of non-GAAP earnings 
disclosure. 
 
3.2 The Effect of New CDIs on the Quality of Non-GAAP Exclusions 
Prior literature on non-GAAP disclosure assesses the quality of non-GAAP earnings by 
investigating whether non-GAAP exclusions have implications for future earnings performance 
(Doyle et al. 2003). Managers who disclose non-GAAP earnings to better inform investors are 
likely to exclude items only if those items are transitory, so that non-GAAP measures better 
reflect core earnings. If excluded items are transitory, they will have no predictive power for 
future performance; thus “high-quality” non-GAAP exclusions are those that have no association 
with future performance. On the other hand, managers who attempt to mislead investors are more 
likely to exclude recurring items from non-GAAP earnings; thus “low-quality” non-GAAP 




The effect of relaxed interpretive guidance on non-GAAP earnings quality is similarly 
unclear. Relaxed interpretive guidance may increase or decrease the quality of non-GAAP 
exclusions, depending on the relative cost reductions in: (1) opportunistic non-GAAP disclosure 
and (2) non-opportunistic non-GAAP disclosure. Heflin and Hsu (2008) suggest that not only did 
non-GAAP regulations discourage opportunistic use of non-GAAP earnings, but they also 
curtailed firms’ willingness to use non-GAAP earnings to better inform investors (non-
opportunistic non-GAAP disclosure). Relaxed interpretive guidance might, however, reduce the 
costs of non-GAAP disclosure.  
Managers who disclose non-GAAP financial measures to better inform investors are likely to 
exclude items only if they are transitory so that non-GAAP measures better reflect core earnings. 
This type of manager was discouraged from using non-GAAP earnings after Regulation G due to 
the high administrative burdens and reputational costs associated with non-GAAP disclosure 
(Heflin and Hsu 2008). Relaxed interpretive guidance is likely to lower such costs of non-
opportunistic non-GAAP disclosure by reducing the additional administrative burdens and 
reputational costs. This allows managers with informative (non-opportunistic) motives to use 
non-GAAP earnings more frequently in order to better inform investors under a relaxed 
regulatory environment, resulting in higher exclusion quality in the post-CDI period relative to 
the pre-CDI period. Therefore, the relaxation of interpretive guidance might be able to attract 
managers who did not report non-GAAP financial measures due to high disclosure costs in the 
pre-CDI period to now disclose non-GAAP earnings in the post-CDI period.  
On the other hand, managers who attempt to mislead investors are more likely to exclude less 
transitory items from non-GAAP earnings, resulting in lower quality exclusions. Since relaxed 




increase opportunistic non-GAAP disclosure by giving opportunistic managers more freedom to 
adjust recurring items and easily misleading investors with non-GAAP earnings under a relaxed 
regulatory environment. If an increase in the frequency of non-GAAP reporting is dominated by 
opportunistic non-GAAP disclosure, then the relaxation of interpretive guidance may result in a 
proliferation of opportunistic non-GAAP earnings to mislead investors, which is likely to lower 
the quality of non-GAAP exclusions in the post-CDI period. 
Finally, the relaxed interpretive guidance may not affect a firm’s non-GAAP reporting 
behavior at all. As previously explained, the new CDIs do not involve any actual regulatory 
changes, but merely represent changes in the interpretation of these regulations. If the initial 
regulation is clear enough so that managers do not need the regulators’ subsequent 
interpretations, then managers are not likely to respond to any changes in the SEC’s interpretive 
guidance related to these regulations. 
Therefore, the second hypothesis is stated in the null form: 
H2: The issuance of new CDIs is not associated with the quality of exclusions from non-




4. Sample Description 
I obtained data from the Unrestated Quarterly Compustat File and I/B/E/S Split Unadjusted 
File from the first quarter of 2006 to the fourth quarter of 2011.15 Following prior research, I use 
I/B/E/S actual earnings as the proxy for non-GAAP earnings (Bradshaw and Sloan 2002; Doyle 
et al. 2003; Heflin and Hsu 2008; Kolev et al. 2008). The primary concern with using I/B/E/S 
actual earnings as a proxy for non-GAAP earnings is whether street earnings disclosed by 
analysts are a good proxy for pro forma earnings released by managers.16 While I/B/E/S actual 
earnings is not a perfect proxy for non-GAAP earnings, the use of I/B/E/S actual earnings as 
opposed to manager-issued non-GAAP earnings is the more conservative choice because 
managers exclude recurring items opportunistically whereas analysts exclude them when it better 
predicts future firm performance (Barth et al. 2011). Gu and Chen (2004) also provide evidence 
that analysts include nonrecurring items in street earnings when they are persistent; furthermore, 
these nonrecurring items that are included have higher valuation multiples than recurring items 
that are excluded from street earnings. Therefore, it is likely to bias my result towards no 
association between future earnings and non-GAAP exclusions. As long as the coefficient on 
non-GAAP earnings is significant, then the inferences made from these tests will not change. I 
use three different samples: (1) a full sample consisting of observations without missing value 
for all variables, (2) a non-zero exclusion sample consisting of observations only where non-
                                                            
15 Due to the unavailability of data, I use the Unrestated Quarterly Compustat File instead of the Preliminary History 
Quarterly Compustat File (Kolev et al. 2008). Since Kolev et al. (2008) use the Preliminary History Quarterly 
Compustat File for as-first-filed financial statement figures, the use of Unrestated Quarterly Compustat File will not 
differ from that from the Preliminary History Quarterly File. 
16 I acknowledge that other empirical research works provide some evidence that I/B/E/S actual EPS is significantly 
different from pro forma earnings disclosed by firms. Bhattacharya et al. (2003) find that there is a significant 
difference (4 cents difference) between pro forma EPS and I/B/E/S actual EPS. They show that 65% of pro forma 
EPS amounts are equal to the I/B/E/S actual EPS amounts, and that managers (pro forma EPS amounts) exclude 
more expenses than analysts (I/B/E/S EPS amounts) do. Using more recent data, Brown et al. (2012) report that the 
mean pro forma EPS (about 31 cents) is higher than the mean I/B/E/S EPS (about 28 cents). To address this issue, I 




GAAP earnings are different from GAAP earnings, and (3) a constant sample consisting of firms 





5. Research Design and Empirical Results 
5.1 The Effect of New CDIs on the Frequency of Non-GAAP Disclosure  
To test H1, I estimate a probit model of the likelihood of disclosing non-GAAP earnings in a 
given quarter. Consistent with Heflin and Hsu (2008), I define a non-GAAP earnings disclosure 
quarter as any quarter when the actual EPS, as reported by I/B/E/S, is different from the basic 
EPS, as reported in Compustat. I model the probability of non-GAAP disclosure in a given 
quarter as a function of new CDI, as follows:17 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏�𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃 𝑞�
= 𝛼0 + 𝜶𝟏𝒏𝒆𝒘𝑪𝑫𝑰𝒒 + 𝛼2𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑞 + 𝛼3𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑞 + 𝛼4𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ
+ 𝛼5𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑞 + 𝛼6𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡-𝑡𝑜-𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑞 + 𝛼7𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑞
+ 𝛼8𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑞 + 𝛼9𝑆𝐼𝑞 + 𝛼10𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑞 + 𝛼11𝐵𝑖𝑔𝑏𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑞 + 𝛼12𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑞






The variables included in the model are as follows: 
Prob(non-GAAPq) = an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm discloses non-GAAP 
earnings in a given quarter and 0 otherwise 
newCDIq = an indicator variable that equals 1 if quarter q is between the first 
calendar quarter of 2010 and the fourth calendar quarter of 2011 
(inclusive), and 0 otherwise 
Ln(Total Assets)q = a natural log of total assets 
Intangiblesq = intangible assets divided by total assets 
Tech = an indicator variable that equals 1 if firm i is a high-tech industry as 
defined in Francis and Schipper (1999) and 0 otherwise 
Sales Growthq = quarter-over-quarter increase in sales, on a per share basis 
Market-to-Bookq = price/(common equity/outstanding shares) 
Leverageq = total liabilities divided by book value of stockholders’ equity 
Earnings Volatilityq = standard deviation of return on assets over at least six of the previous 
eight quarters 
SIq = an indicator variable that equals 1 if firm reports a special item in 
quarter q and 0 otherwise 
Special Itemq = a dollar amount of special items 
Bigbathq = an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm reports a negative special 
item and negative earnings in the same quarter and 0 otherwise 
                                                            
17 Lougee and Marquardt (2004) examine the economic determinants of pro forma reporting; Marques (2006) and 




Lossq = an indicator variable equal to 1 if earnings before extraordinary items 
for the quarter is less than 0 and 0 otherwise 
QTR4 = an indicator variable for the fourth fiscal quarter 
Industry Fixed Effect = Fama-French 48 industry classfication 
The dependent variable, Prob(non-GAAPq), is an indicator variable that equals one if a firm 
discloses non-GAAP earnings in a given quarter and zero otherwise. newCDIq is an indicator 
variable that equals one if quarter q is between the first quarter of 2010 and the fourth quarter of 
2011 (inclusive), and zero otherwise.18 
The model includes control variables that extant literature has identified as factors affecting 
non-GAAP disclosure. I include Ln(Total Assets)q because large firms tend to disclose non-
GAAP earnings more frequently. Firms with high intangibles or high-tech firms have less 
informative GAAP earnings, and therefore are more likely to release pro forma earnings than 
other firms (Lougee and Marquardt 2004). As such, I include the amount of intangible assets 
(Intangiblesq) and a high-tech indicator variable (Tech). Since growth firms are more likely to 
report pro forma earnings, sales growth rate (Sales Growthq) and market-to-book ratio (Market 
to Bookq) are included in the model (Lougee and Marquardt 2004).  
Lougee and Marquardt (2004) document that higher leverage ratios are associated with the 
increased likelihood of earnings management, which may result in less informative GAAP 
earnings; therefore, I use Leverageq as an additional control. Earnings Volatilityq is used as a 
control because investors tend to demand additional information when earnings are volatile 
(Defond and Hung 2003). Firms reporting large special items are more likely to disclose non-
GAAP earnings. Following Heflin and Hsu (2008), I include two controls for special items: (1) 
                                                            




SIq and (2) Special Itemq.19 In addition, a big bath indicator variable (Bigbathq) is included 
because firms are more likely to report non-GAAP earnings when they report a one-time charge. 
Since firms missing earnings benchmarks are more likely to disclose non-GAAP earnings, I 
include the Lossq indicator variable. Heflin and Hsu (2008) find that firms are more likely to 
disclose non-GAAP earnings in the fourth quarter than in other quarters, so I include the QTR4 
indicator variable. 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in testing H1 and H2. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to mitigate the concern about 
observations with extreme values. 42.5% of firms in my sample report non-GAAP earnings. 
Mean (median) GAAP and non-GAAP earnings are 0.244 (0.210) and 0.316 (0.240). The mean 
amount for: non-GAAP exclusion is 0.052, special items is 0.016, and other exclusions is 0.034, 
respectively. Among the full sample, 37.6% of firm-quarters report special items and 41% 
exclude items other than special items.  
Table 2 exhibits the differences of variables (means and medians) across two time periods 
(pre-CDI and post-CDI period). Mean (median) non-GAAP earnings has significantly increased 
from 0.302 (0.240) to 0.338 (0.240). However, the mean non-GAAP exclusion amount has 
significantly decreased from 0.054 to 0.05 while mean special items and other exclusions are not 
significantly different between the two periods. Total assets and sales growth rates have also 
significantly increased between the two periods and earnings have become more volatile, 
increasing from 0.023 to 0.026. Finally, future operating income (Fopi) has increased 
significantly over time from 0.963 to 1.320. Lougee and Marquardt (2004) provide evidence that 
                                                            
19 In addition to these measures, Heflin and Hsu (2008) include the magnitude of industry mean special items 
because it explains a significant portion of the probability of disclosing non-GAAP earnings. Including this variable 




firms with high earnings volatility or high-growth firms are more likely to engage in non-GAAP 
reporting because investors demand additional information to help them interpret GAAP 
earnings. In general, Table 2 suggests that firms disclose smaller amounts of non-GAAP 
exclusions in the post-CDI period, relative to the pre-CDI period, even though managers have 
greater flexibility to be opportunistic in the post-CDI period. 
The results for H1 are presented in Table 3. Standard errors are adjusted based on the Huber-
White sandwich estimate of variances and clustered by firm. I find the coefficient on newCDI, 
α1, to be significantly positive (0.210), suggesting that managers release non-GAAP measures 
more frequently after the issuance of new CDI. The percentage change in non-GAAP reporting 
between the two periods is economically and statistically significant. The probability of reporting 
non-GAAP earnings is 8.23% higher in the post-CDI period than in the pre-CDI period. This 
indicates that the SEC staff interpretations allow registrants to change their non-GAAP reporting 
practices. I conduct the same tests with an S&P500 and a constant sample, as presented in 
columns 2 and 3, respectively. These results are very similar to those from the full sample.  
With respect to the control variables, the results are, in general, consistent with the findings 
from prior research. Focusing on the full sample results, firm size, ln(Total Assets)q, is positively 
related to the probability of non-GAAP disclosure (the estimated coefficient is 0.151). Consistent 
with GAAP earnings of high-technology firms being less informative, high-technology firms are 
more likely to disclose non-GAAP earnings (0.575). Sales growth rate (Sales Growthq) is 
positively associated with non-GAAP disclosure in all three samples, suggesting that the higher a 
firm’s sales growth rate, the more likely it is to disclose non-GAAP earnings. 20  SIq is 
significantly positive (0.927), consistent with firms that report special items being more likely to 
                                                            




disclose non-GAAP earnings. A negative coefficient on Special Itemq indicates that the larger 
the income-decreasing special item is, the more likely firms are to disclose non-GAAP earnings. 
While the coefficient on Bigbathq (-0.136) is negative in the full sample, it is insignificant in 
column 2 and marginally negative in column 3. The positive coefficient on Lossq (0.140) 
suggests that firms are more likely to disclose non-GAAP earnings when they miss GAAP 
earnings benchmarks. Finally, the positive coefficient (0.152) on QTR4 suggests that firms are 
more likely to disclose non-GAAP earnings in the fourth fiscal quarter. 
The results presented in Table 3 are consistent with the view that staff interpretations on non-
GAAP reporting effectively change non-GAAP reporting practices by firms. Relaxed 
interpretive guidance reduced the potential costs imposed on managers associated with the use of 
non-GAAP earnings, allowing managers to disclose non-GAAP information more frequently. 
Increases in the frequency of non-GAAP disclosure can, however, be the result of either 
opportunistic or non-opportunistic managers. Since the purpose of relaxing the interpretive 
guidance on Regulation G was not to suggest that registrants could use non-GAAP earnings as 
they had done before Regulation G, it is necessary to examine how exclusion quality changed 
following the issuance of the new CDIs.21 Opportunistic managers who stopped providing non-
GAAP earnings after the initial SEC intervention in 2003 might have started to release non-
GAAP earnings after the issuance of the new CDIs in 2010 in attempts to mislead investors 
through non-GAAP earnings, indicating lower quality non-GAAP exclusions following the 
issuance of the new CDIs. On the other hand, non-opportunistically-motivated managers might 
have started to release non-GAAP earnings after the issuance of the new CDIs because they can 
                                                            
21 Ms. Cross, director of the DCF, indicated at the 2009 AICPA National Conference that she was not suggesting 
that revision of interpretive guidance on non-GAAP financial measures means that companies go back to their non-




now better communicate core earnings to investors, indicating higher quality exclusions 
following the new CDI issuance. Therefore, exclusion quality tests will verify the type of 
managers who are, on average, most influenced by relaxed interpretive guidance. 
5.2 The Effect of New CDIs on the Quality of Non-GAAP Exclusions 
To test H2, I define higher quality non-GAAP exclusions as being more transitory and 
having no predictive power for future operating income (Doyle et al., 2003; Kolev et al., 2008). 
Following Kolev et al. (2008), I use future operating income (earnings per share from operations), 
summed over the four quarters beginning with quarter q+1 as the dependent variable for the test 
of exclusion quality. One advantage of using future EPS from operations as a dependent variable 
is that Compustat excludes nonrecurring special items but includes recurring items which may be 
classified as other exclusions from non-GAAP earnings (Kolev et al., 2008). I estimate the 
following ordinary least squares regression with errors clustered by CUSIP to eliminate any 
residual dependence due to firm-specific effects:22  
𝐹𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑞+1,𝑞+4 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑁𝑜𝑛-𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑞 + 𝛼2𝑁𝑜𝑛-𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃 𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑞 + 𝛼3𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐶𝐷𝐼
+ 𝜶𝟒𝒏𝒆𝒘𝑪𝑫𝑰 × 𝑵𝒐𝒏-𝑮𝑨𝑨𝑷𝑬𝒙𝒄𝒍𝒖𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒒  + 𝛼5𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑞
+ 𝛼6𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡-𝑡𝑜-𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑞 + 𝛼7𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑞 + 𝛼8𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑞
+ 𝛼9𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑞  + 𝛼10𝐿𝑛(𝐴𝑔𝑒)𝑞 +  𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡




Control variables included in the models are as follows: 
Sale Growthq = quarter-over-quarter increase in sales, on a per share basis  
Market-to-bookq = price/(common equity/outstanding shares) 
Ln(Total Assets)q  = natural log of total assets in millions and corresponds to quarter q 
Earnings Volatility = standard deviation of return on assets over at least six of the previous 
eight quarters 
Lossq = an indicator variable equal to 1 if earnings before extraordinary 
items for the quarter is less than 0 and 0 otherwise. 
Ln(Age)q = natural log of the number of years since a company first appeared in 
Compustat 
                                                            
22 Petersen (2009) demonstrates that it generates unbiased estimators and I use this method in order to be consistent 




Following Kolev et al. (2008), I use future operating income (Fopi), which is defined as 
earnings per share from operations summed over the four quarters beginning with quarter q+1, 
as the dependent variable for the test of exclusion quality. As explained earlier, non-GAAP 
earnings (Non-GAAP Earningsq) are proxied by I/B/E/S actual earnings and non-GAAP 
exclusions (Non-GAAP Exclusionsq) are defined as non-GAAP earnings less income before 
extraordinary items per share. The main variable of interest is the interaction between newCDI 
and Non-GAAP Exclusionsq. I expect 𝛼4  to be positive if relaxed interpretive guidance 
encourages non-opportunistically motivated managers to release non-GAAP earnings which they 
believe better reflect their performance. On the other hand, a negative result on 𝛼4 suggests that 
relaxed interpretive guidance encourages opportunistically motivated managers to disclose non-
GAAP measures after the issuance of new CDIs.  
Doyle et al. (2003) argue that growth firms tend to have lower future operating cash flows 
because of long-term investments and increases in working capital and consequently they find a 
negative association between sales growth rate and future performance. In addition, prior 
empirical work finds that the market-to-book ratio is positively correlated to future earnings and 
non-GAAP reporting decisions. Therefore I include controls for the sales growth rate 
(SalesGrowthq) and the market-to-book ratio (Market-to-bookq). I included the natural log of 
total assets to control for firm size. Firms with less persistent earnings could be perceived as 
having lower quality earnings, creating a demand for additional information (Lougee and 




Ln(Age)q to consider the potential effects of firm age on non-GAAP exclusions and future 
earnings.23  
The results of H2 are presented in Table 4. Focusing on the full sample (column 1), 𝛼1 is 
significantly positive (2.342).24 Doyle et al. (2003) and Kolev et al. (2008) interpret a negative 
relation between non-GAAP exclusions and future operating income as evidence that the 
excluded items are recurring in the future. I find the coefficient on Non-GAAP Exclusionsq, 𝛼3, 
is -0.609 in Table 4, suggesting that one dollar of excluded expenses in the current period is 
likely to incur 60.9 cents of expenses over next four quarters in the pre-CDI period. If the new 
CDIs have improved exclusion quality, the exclusions should be less negatively correlated with 
future operating income in the post-CDI period than pre-CDI period (𝛼4>0). If the new CDIs 
have encouraged firms to opportunistically use non-GAAP earnings, the relation between 
exclusions and future operating income should be more negatively correlated following the 
issuance of the new CDIs (𝛼4<0). The coefficient on NewCDI×Non-GAAP Exclusionsq, 𝛼4, is 
0.245, suggesting that the new CDIs on non-GAAP disclosures improve the quality of non-
GAAP exclusions. It indicates that one dollar of excluded expenses in the current period is 
associated with 36.4 (-60.9+24.5) cents of expenses over the next four quarters. This result holds 
in the non-zero exclusion and constant samples with similar magnitudes, as presented in columns 
(2) and (3), respectively, of Table 4.  
Sales Growthq and Market-to-Bookq are positively related to the future operating income 
(0.044 and 0.022, respectively). Firm size (Ln(Total Assets)q) is also significantly positively 
associated with future operating income. The earnings persistence variables (Earnings 
                                                            
23 Doyle et al. (2003) include total accruals as a control variable because accruals will reverse in the future. 
Including total accruals does not change the inferences of this paper. 
24 If earnings are perfectly permanent, the estimated coefficient of 𝛼1 would be 4 because future operating income is 




Volatilityq and Lossq) are negatively related to future operating incomes, suggesting the less 
persistent earnings are, the lower the future operating income is. Finally, I document a 
significantly positive association between firm age (Ln(Age)q) and future operating income 
(0.142).  
Taken together, my findings from H1 and H2 are consistent with the view that an 
overreaction to Regulation G led to a diminished information environment and the staff 
interpretations which relax the enforcement of Regulation G effectively change registrants’ non-
GAAP reporting practices. A higher frequency and improved quality of non-GAAP disclosure 
following the issuance of new CDIs is consistent with an increase in the ‘informative’ use of 
non-GAAP reporting following the issuance of the new CDIs. While the SEC in 2001 
successfully discouraged some opportunistically-motivated managers from improperly using 
non-GAAP earnings, it also discouraged some managers with informative motives from 
communicating firm performance through non-GAAP earnings. (Heflin and Hsu 2003; Kolev et 
al. 2008).  
This paper complements the findings in Kolev et al. (2008) and Heflin and Hsu (2008) by 
documenting that a relaxed regulatory environment allows non-opportunistically motivated 
managers to disclose non-GAAP earnings more frequently, effectively communicating core or 
permanent earnings with non-GAAP financial measures. Two important insights for regulators 
are: (1) their goals can be achieved through interpretive guidance without actual changes in 
regulation; and (2) relaxed reporting requirements come with lower costs of non-opportunistic 
disclosure, resulting in enhanced information environments (Doogar et al. 2010)25.  
                                                            
25 Doogar et al. (2010) examine the costs imposed by crisis-induced overregulation in the audit field. Their results 
are consistent [consistent with what?] that overregulation (Auditing Standard 2) induced by SOX resulted in 




5.3 Starting vs. Continuing Non-GAAP Reporters  
Managers’ decisions to disclose non-GAAP earnings depend on the costs and benefits of the 
disclosure (Kolev et al. 2008), which are likely to vary based on managerial motivation to either 
mislead or better inform investors with non-GAAP disclosures. Increased frequency (H1) is 
consistent with managers viewing non-GAAP disclosure as less costly after the issuance of the 
new CDIs and improved quality (H2) indicates that non-GAAP earnings are more informative in 
the post-CDI period, relative to the pre-CDI period. 
There are at least two explanations for the increased frequency (H1) and improved quality 
(H2) of non-GAAP disclosure. One explanation is that firms with non-opportunistic motives, 
which had not disclosed non-GAAP earnings in the pre-CDI period, began reporting non-GAAP 
earnings in the post-CDI period. Alternatively, firms that have continuously disclosed non-
GAAP earnings may report higher quality non-GAAP earnings in the post-CDI period. To 
eliminate this alternative explanation, I examine the relative quality of non-GAAP exclusions in 
the post-CDI period between two groups: (1) firms that had not disclosed non-GAAP earnings in 
the pre-CDI period and started to issue non-GAAP earnings in the post-CDI period (Starting 
Reporter) and (2) firms that continuously and frequently report non-GAAP earnings in both pre- 
and post-CDI period (Frequent Reporter).26  
Panel A of Table 5 presents the result of this analysis. First, 𝛼4 is 0.513, suggesting that in 
the post-CDI period the exclusion quality of Starting Reporters is significantly higher than that 
of Frequent Reporters. This result, however, does not eliminate the alternative explanation 
because it is still possible that the exclusion quality of Frequent Reporters might improve in the 
                                                            
26 Firms are classified as Starting Reporters if they had not reported non-GAAP earnings in the pre-CDI period at 
all, but started to disclose non-GAAP earnings more than or equal to once in the post-CDI period. On the other hand, 





post-CDI period, relative to the pre-CDI period. Therefore, I reexamine the relative exclusion 
quality only for Frequent Reporters. The result for Frequent Reporters is presented in Panel B 
of Table 5. I do not find evidence of a difference in exclusion quality for Frequent Reporters 
between the pre- and post-CDI period (𝛼4=0). This result suggests that the relaxed interpretive 
guidance reduced the cost of non-opportunistic non-GAAP disclosure by eliminating the 
restrictive language from the prior guidance and further encouraging firms with informative 
motives, which were previously discouraged from reporting non-GAAP earnings due to high 
administrative burdens, to now disclose non-GAAP earnings under the relaxed regulatory 
environment in the post-CDI period. 
5.4 Decomposition of Total Exclusions into Special Items and Other Exclusions 
I decompose non-GAAP earnings exclusions into special items and other exclusions to 
examine whether the exclusion quality improvement is due to either special items or other 
exclusions. Following Doyle et al. (2003), I define special items (Special Items) as operating 
income less GAAP earnings and other exclusions (OtherExclusion) as non-GAAP exclusions 
less special items (defined above), and then estimate the following least squares regression 
model: 
𝐹𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑞+1,𝑞+4 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑁𝑜𝑛-𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑞 + 𝛼2𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑠𝑞 + 𝛼3𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑞
+ 𝛼4𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐶𝐷𝐼 + 𝛼5𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐶𝐷𝐼 × 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑠𝑞 + 𝛼6𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐶𝐷𝐼 × 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑞
+ �𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀𝑞+1,𝑞+4 
Doyle et al. (2003) provide evidence of little predictability of special items but report high 
future predictive ability of other exclusions. They report that special items are not related to 




related to future CFO. On the other hand, Burgstahler, Jiambalvo, and Shevlin (2002) provide 
evidence that special items are positively associated with future earnings. McVay (2006) 
provides evidence that managers shift recurring expenses into special items, resulting in 
improvement in the quality of non-GAAP earnings. Kolev et al. (2008) show that Regulation G 
improves the quality of other exclusions, but the quality of special items has become worse over 
time. This suggests that the new CDIs may have different implications for special items and 
other exclusions. 
Table 6 presents the results using special items and other exclusions. Referring to the main 
effects, low-quality exclusions are driven by other exclusions as opposed to special items. The 
interaction between newCDI and Special Items (𝛼5) is marginally negative or insignificantly 
related to future operating income. On the other hand, the coefficient on the interaction term 
between newCDI and Other Exclusions (𝛼6)  is significantly positively related with future 
operating income (0.586, 0.561, and 0.697, respectively), suggesting that other exclusion quality 
significantly improves in the post-CDI period while that of special items does not. The positive 
coefficient on 𝒏𝒆𝒘𝑪𝑫𝑰 × 𝑶𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝑬𝒙𝒄𝒍𝒖𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏  and the insignificant or marginally negative 
coefficient on 𝒏𝒆𝒘𝑪𝑫𝑰 × 𝑺𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝑰𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒔  imply that managers are less likely to designate 
recurring expenses as other exclusions than as special items following the issuance of the new 
CDIs. Relaxed interpretive guidance on non-GAAP disclosure allows managers to exclude more 






6. ADDITIONAL TESTS 
6.1 The Effect of Board Independence on the Quality of Non-GAAP Exclusions 
Frankel et al. (2011) provide evidence that more independent boards can curb the 
opportunistic use of non-GAAP exclusions through stronger monitoring over earnings-related 
disclosures and that increased scrutiny by the SEC over non-GAAP disclosures substituted for 
board oversight following Regulation G. This implies that exclusion quality improvement 
following the issuance of new CDIs may be driven by firms with a more independent board due 
to the substitution effects between regulatory scrutiny and board oversight.   
I obtain director data from The Corporate Library. Board independence is defined as the 
percentage of outside directors on the board. To examine the role of independent boards on the 
quality of non-GAAP exclusions, I separate the full sample into two subsamples: (1) those firms 
with a percentage of independent board members greater than or equal to the industry mean and 
(2) those firms with a percentage of independent board members less than the industry mean.  
The results of the board analysis are presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table 7. I find a 
significantly positive coefficient on 𝒏𝒆𝒘𝑪𝑫𝑰 × 𝑵𝒐𝒏-𝑮𝑨𝑨𝑷 𝑬𝒙𝒄𝒍𝒖𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 (𝛼4=0.372) only in the 
subsample of firms with a greater percentage of independent board members than the industry 
mean, suggesting that better corporate governance leads managers to use non-GAAP exclusions 
to better inform investors when more discretion is given to them. This result not only supports 
the notion that managerial opportunism is curbed in the presence of strong board oversight, but it 
is also consistent with strong board oversight encouraging managers to use non-GAAP earnings 
in an informative way. Overall, the results of Table 7 support the argument that board oversight 





6.2 Meeting/Beating Analyst Forecasts  
Managers opportunistically use non-GAAP earnings to meet or beat analyst forecasts (Doyle 
et al. 2013). Since more transitory exclusion items is a result of less opportunistic use of non-
GAAP earnings, managers are expected to less opportunistically use non-GAAP earnings to 
exceed analyst forecasts in the post-CDI period. Following Doyle et al. (2013), I define 
PosExclUse as an indicator variable equal to one if the amount of non-GAAP exclusions is 
greater than zero and zero otherwise. The results of this analysis are displayed in Table 8. 
Consistent with the results in Doyle et al. (2013), I find a significantly positive coefficient on 
PosExclUse (0.255, z-stat=17.54), as presented in column 1. Prior to the issuance of the new 
CDIs, the probability of exceeding analyst forecasts increases by 9.15% when firms exclude 
expenses to define non-GAAP earnings. Table 8 exhibits that the frequency of meeting or 
beating analyst forecasts using positive exclusions is lower in the post-CDI period than the pre-
CDI period (𝛼3= -0.078). This probability decreases by 2.89% in the post-CDI period. The 
results from Table 8 are consistent with higher quality non-GAAP earnings being representative 
of less opportunistic non-GAAP earnings, and they further support the argument that relaxing 
excessive regulation on voluntary disclosure may improve the quality of the information 
contained in the voluntary disclosure. 
As Table 6 shows that improved quality of non-GAAP exclusions were concentrated on other 
exclusions, I expect the frequency of exceeding analyst forecasts to be lower in the post-CDI 
period only when a firm reports positive other exclusions, but not special items. Column 2 of 
Table 8 shows results consistent with this prediction. I find a significantly negative coefficient 
( 𝛼5 = -0.069 with p-value=0.0001) on newCDI × PosOtheExclUse, but an insignificant 




conclusion that non-GAAP exclusion quality, especially the quality of other exclusions, 





7. CONCLUSIONS  
In 2010, SEC staff members within the Division of Corporate Finance issued new 
interpretive guidance on non-GAAP regulations, which superseded prior guidance issued in 2003. 
The new guidance relaxed the previous interpretive guidance on how to adjust for recurring 
items in a non-GAAP financial measure. The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of 
relaxed staff interpretations (CDIs) on non-GAAP disclosures.  
This paper provides evidence that a relaxation of prior guidance on non-GAAP disclosure 
encouraged managers to release non-GAAP information more frequently. Managers are 8.23% 
more likely to disclose non-GAAP earnings in the post-CDI period, relative to the pre-CDI 
period. The result is consistent with staff interpretations effectively changing registrants’ 
voluntary disclosure practices. I also examine the quality of non-GAAP exclusions to see 
whether the relaxed interpretive guidance on non-GAAP disclosure affects exclusion quality. In 
particular, the non-GAAP exclusion quality of firms that started to report non-GAAP earnings 
(Starting Reporters) in the post-CDI period is higher than that of firms that have continuously 
reported non-GAAP earnings (Frequent Reporters). This suggests that the relaxed interpretive 
guidance in 2010 reduced the cost of non-opportunistic non-GAAP disclosure, resulting in both a 
higher frequency and quality of non-GAAP earnings. 
The quality of non-GAAP exclusions, especially other exclusions, improves after the 
issuance of relaxed interpretive guidance. In further analysis, I find that the exclusion quality 
improvement is concentrated in firms with boards comprised of more independent directors, 
which is consistent with strong board oversight curbing the opportunistic use of non-GAAP 
earnings and encouraging managers to better inform investors. Finally, I find that the frequency 




compared to the pre-CDI period, further supporting the results of higher exclusion quality in the 
post-CDI period. 
These findings are relevant to regulators and standard setters. While the lack of transparency 
surrounding the rulemaking procedures and the nonbinding nature of interpretive guidance raise 
a question about the effectiveness of guidance on registrants’ disclosure practices, this paper 
provides evidence that nonbinding SEC staff interpretations affect registrants’ disclosure 
practices. In addition, I provide useful insight into the consequences of relaxed regulation on 
voluntary disclosure. Bushee and Leuz (2005) show that mandating SEC reporting requirements 
for firms that were traded on the OTCBB forced a large number of those firms into a less 
regulated market. Shroff et al. (2013) also show that allowing more discretion in freely 
disclosing information prior to an equity offering is associated with less information asymmetry 
and a lower cost of equity capital. Similarly, this paper contributes to the literature on voluntary 
disclosure and accounting quality by using a unique setting of relaxed reporting requirements to 








Variable N Mean 1st Q Median 3rd Q Std. Dev. 
Prob(Non-GAAP) 67,408 0.425 0 0 1 0.494 
GAAP Earning 67,408 0.244 0.010 0.210 0.500 1.225 
Non-GAAP Earnings 67,408 0.316 0.050 0.240 0.520 0.512 
Non-GAAP Exclusions 67,408 0.052 0 0 0.030 0.246 
Special Items 67,408 0.016 0 0 0 0.085 
SI 67,408 0.376 0 0 1 0.484 
Other Exclusions 67,408 0.034 0 0 0.020 0.155 
OE 67,408 0.410 0 0 1 0.492 
newCDI 67,408 0.384 0 0 1 0.486 
Ln(Total Assets) 67,408 6.939 3.112 5.582 6.857 8.132 
Intangibles 67,408 0.155 0.006 0.069 0.252 0.189 
Tech 67,408 0.249 0 0 0 0.432 
Market-to-Book 67,408 2.960 1.227 1.935 3.243 3.541 
Sales Growth 67,408 0.344 -0.079 0.177 0.658 1.621 
Leverage 67,408 0.945 0.034 0.394 1.035 1.808 
Earnings Volatility 67,408 0.024 0.004 0.009 0.023 0.045 
Bigbath 67,408 0.109 0 0 0 0.312 
Loss 67,408 0.241 0 0 0 0.428 
QTR4 67,408 0.260 0 0 1 0.439 
Fopi 68,567 1.042 0.010 0.750 1.860 2.074 
Ln(Age) 68,567 2.772 2.303 2.773 3.258 0.645 
 
Prob(Non-GAAP) = an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm discloses non-GAAP earnings in quarter q and 0 otherwise. 
GAAP Earning = earnings per share before extraordinary items 
Non-GAAP Earnings = I/B/E/S actual earnings per share 
Non-GAAP Exclusions = Non-GAAP Earnings – GAAP Earnings 
Special Item = Operating Income less GAAP Earnings where Operating Income is earnings per share from operations 
SI = an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm reports a special item in quarter q and 0 otherwise 
Other Exclusions = Non-GAAP Exclusions – Special Items 
OE = an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm excludes items other than special items in quarter q and 0 otherwise 
newCDI = an indicator variable that equals 1 if the observation falls between Q1 2010 and Q2 2011 (inclusive), and 0 otherwise 
Ln(Total Asset)s = a natural log of total assets in millions in quarter q 
Intangibles = intangible assets divided by total assets 
Tech = an indicator variable that equals one if firm i is a high-tech industry as defined in Francis and Schipper (1999); 
Market-to-Book = price/(common equity/outstanding shares); 
Sales Growth = quarter-over-quarter increase in sales, on a per share basis 
Leverage = total liabilities divided by book value of stockholders’ equity 
Earnings Volatility = standard deviation of return on assets over at least six of the previous eight quarters 
Bigbath = an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm reports a negative special items and negative earnings in the same quarter 
and 0 otherwise 
Loss = an indicator variable equal to 1 if earnings before extraordinary items for the quarter is less than 0 and 0 otherwise 
QTR4 = an indicator variable for 4th quarter 
Fopi = earnings per share from operations summed over the four quarters beginning with quarter q+1 






Descriptive Statistics for Time Subgroups 








2006 Q1 through 2009Q4 
 
2010 Q1 through 2011 Q4 
 
t-test/Wilcoxon Rank sum 




t-test  Wilcoxon 

























SI 0.358 0.000  0.405 0.000  0.000 0.000 





OE 0.373 0.000  0.468 0.000  0.000 0.000 













































Fopi 0.963 0.860  1.320 1.345  0.000 0.000 













The sample period covers the first quarter of 2006 through the fourth quarter of 2011 (2006 Q1–2011 Q4).  
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏�𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃 𝑞�
= 𝛼0 + 𝜶𝟏𝒏𝒆𝒘𝑪𝑫𝑰𝒒 + 𝛼2𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑞 + 𝛼3𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑞 + 𝛼4𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑞
+ 𝛼5𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡-𝑡𝑜- 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑞 + 𝛼6𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑞 + 𝛼7𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑞
+ 𝛼8𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑞 + 𝛼9𝑆𝐼𝑞 + 𝛼10𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚 + 𝛼11𝐵𝑖𝑔𝑏𝑎𝑡ℎ + 𝛼12𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑞
+ 𝛼13𝑄𝑇𝑅4 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 +  𝜀𝑞 
 
newCDI: an indicator variable that equals 1 if the observation falls between Q1 2010 and Q2 2011 (inclusive), and 0 
otherwise; Ln(total assets): natural log of total assets; Intangibles: Intangible assets divided by total assets; Tech: an 
indicator variable that equals one if firm i is a high-tech industry as defined in Francis and Schipper (1999); Market-to-
book: price/(common equity/outstanding shares); Sales Growth: the increase in sales, on a per share basis; Leverage: Total 
liabilities divided by book value of stockholders’ equity; Earnings Volatility: standard deviation of ROA over past 8 
quarters; SI: an indicator variable that equals one if firm reports a special item in quarter q and zero otherwise; Special 
Item: the amount of reported special items; Bigbath: an indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm reports a negative special 
items and negative earnings in the same quarter; Loss: an indicator variable equal to 1 if earnings before extraordinary 
items for the quarter is less than 0, and 0 otherwise; QTR4: an indicator variable if the quarter is the 4th quarter and 0 
otherwise. 
All continuous variables (with the exception of the lower bound of age) are winsorized at 1 percent and 99 percent. 
***, **, and * represent two-sided p-values of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1, respectively. Errors are clustered by CUSIP. 
 
Dependent Variable  Probability of non-GAAP disclosure in a quarter  
  Full Sample   S&P 500 firms   Constant Sample 
  Coef.   Robust z   Coef.   Robust z   Coef.   Robust z 
Intercept -1.844 *** -12.37 
 
-1.799 ** -2.52   -1.609 *** -6.81 
newCDI 0.210 *** 13.20 
 
0.183 *** 2.99 
 
0.166 *** 8.33 
Ln(Total Assets) 0.151 *** 14.79 
 
0.179 *** 2.57 
 
0.139 *** 9.47 
Intangibles 0.343 *** 3.73 
 
0.684 * 1.93 
 
0.387 *** 2.86 
Tech 0.575 *** 6.89 
 
0.973 *** 2.72 
 
0.578 *** 4.46 
Sales Growth -0.043 * -1.91  0.112   1.19  -0.026   -0.78 
Market-to-book -0.006 * -1.69 
 
-0.005   -0.29 
 
-0.020 *** -2.91 
Leverage 0.007   0.75 
 
-0.005   -0.12 
 
0.013   0.88 
Earnings Volatility 1.224 *** 4.51 
 
2.442   1.07 
 
1.483 ** 2.55 
SI 0.927 *** 42.77 
 
1.178 *** 15.98 
 
1.021 *** 35.66 
Special Items 4.872 *** 28.11 
 
3.763 *** 8.32 
 
4.409 *** 21.08 
Bigbath -0.136 *** -3.91 
 
0.027   0.14 
 
-0.099 * -1.86 
Loss 0.140 *** 4.61 
 
0.376 ** 2.05 
 
0.182 *** 3.92 
QTR4 0.152 *** 13.13 
 
0.077 * 1.69 
 
0.128 *** 8.49 
            Marginal Effect of 




8.23%  6.70%  6.53% 




















The Effect of New CDIs on Exclusion Quality 
 
The sample period covers the first quarter of 2006 through the fourth quarter of 2010 (2006 Q1–2010 Q4).  
 
𝐹𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑞+1,𝑞+4 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑁𝑜𝑛-𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑞 + 𝛼2𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐶𝐷𝐼 + 𝛼3𝑁𝑜𝑛-𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃 𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑞
+ 𝜶𝟒𝒏𝒆𝒘𝑪𝑫𝑰 × 𝑵𝒐𝒏-𝑮𝑨𝑨𝑷 𝑬𝒙𝒄𝒍𝒖𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒒  + 𝛼5𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑞 + 𝛼6𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡-𝑡𝑜-𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑞
+ 𝛼7𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑞 + 𝛼8𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑞 + 𝛼9𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑞  + 𝛼12𝐿𝑛(𝐴𝑔𝑒)𝑞
+  𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀𝑞+1,𝑞+4 
 
Future Operating Income: Earnings per Share from operation which is summed over four quarters starting from quarter 
q+1; newCDI: an indicator variable that equals 1 if the observation falls between Q1 2010 and Q2 2011 (inclusive), and 0 
otherwise; Non-GAAP Earnings: I/B/E/S reported actual (basic) earnings per share; Non-GAAP Exclusions: Non-GAAP 
Earnings - GAAP Earnings; Sales Growth: quarter-over-quarter increase in sales, on a per share basis; Market-to-book: 
price/(common equity/outstanding shares); Ln(Total Assets): log of total assetsin quarter q; Earnings Volatility: standard 
deviation of return on assets over at least six of the previous eight quarters; Loss: an indicator variable equal to 1 if 
earnings before extraordinary items for the quarter is less than 0, and 0 otherwise; Ln(Age): Log of the number of years 
since the company first appeared in Compustat. 
All continuous variables (with the exception of the lower bound of age) are winsorized at 1 percent and 99 percent. 
***, **, and * represent two-sided p-values of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1, respectively. Errors are clustered by CUSIP. 
 
Dependent Variable:                                                                    Future operating Income 



















Intercept -0.263   -0.63 
 
0.727   0.94 
 
-0.107   -0.81 
Non-GAAP Earnings 2.342 *** 38.8 
 
2.289 *** 28.73 
 
2.341 *** 28.34 
newCDI -0.100 *** -3.17 
 
-0.173 *** -3.31 
 
-0.154 *** -3.93 
Non-GAAP Exclusions -0.609 *** -8.60 
 
-0.570 *** -7.82 
 
-0.560 *** -6.27 
newCDI×Non-GAAP Exclusions 0.245 ** 2.26 
 
0.249 ** 2.22 
 
0.312 ** 2.34 
Sales Growth 0.044 *** 5.65 
 
0.034 *** 3.34 
 
0.053 *** 5.05 
Market-to-Book 0.022 *** 8.51  0.026 *** 7.14  0.044 *** 7.90 
Ln(Total Assets) 0.127 *** 15.34 
 
0.151 *** 10.95 
 
0.137 *** 10.25 
Earnings Volatility -0.021   -0.54 
 
-0.104 * -1.74 
 
-1.259 ** -2.48 
Loss -0.105 *** -3.46 
 
-0.072 * -1.74 
 
-0.066   -1.46 
Ln(Age) 0.142 *** 7.06 
 
0.088 ** 2.52 
 
0.154 *** 4.40 
            Time Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 68,567  24,612  38,078 
















The Exclusion Quality for Starting and Continuing Non-GAAP Reporters 
 
𝐹𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑞+1,𝑞+4 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑁𝑜𝑛-𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑞 + 𝛼2𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 + 𝛼3𝑁𝑜𝑛-𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃 𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑞
+ 𝜶𝟒𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒆𝒓 × 𝑵𝒐𝒏-𝑮𝑨𝑨𝑷 𝑬𝒙𝒄𝒍𝒖𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒒  + 𝛼5𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑞 + 𝛼6𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡-𝑡𝑜-𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑞
+ 𝛼7𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑞 + 𝛼8𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑞 + 𝛼9𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑞  + 𝛼12𝐿𝑛(𝐴𝑔𝑒)𝑞
+  𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀𝑞+1,𝑞+4 
 
Panel A. Model of Future Operating Income on Exclusions and Starter vs. Frequent Reporter in the Post-CDI Period (2010 
Q1–2011 Q4) 












Non-GAAP Exclusions -0.495 *** -2.82 
Starter×Non-GAAP Exclusions 0.513 ** 2.46 
Sales Growth 0.075 ** 2.13 
Market-to-Book 0.025 ** 2.28 
Ln(Total Assets) 0.175 *** 5.40 









    Time Fixed Effect Yes 





Panel B. Model of Future Operating Income on Exclusions only for Continuing Non-GAAP Reporters (2006 Q1–2010 Q4) 
 








Non-GAAP Earnings 2.315 *** 17.20 
newCDI -0.191 ** -2.10 
Non-GAAP Exclusions -0.441 *** -3.36 
newCDI×Non-GAAP Exclusions -0.120 
 
-0.11 
Sales Growth 0.036 * 1.92 
Market-to-Book 0.033 *** 3.80 
Ln(Total Assets) 0.105 *** 4.12 






Ln(Age) 0.131 ** 2.03 
    Time Fixed Effect Yes 









Decomposition of Non-GAAP Exclusions into Special Items and Other Exclusions 
 
The sample period covers the first quarter of 2006 through the fourth quarter of 2010 (2006 Q1–2010 Q4).  
 
𝐹𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑞+1,𝑞+4 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑁𝑜𝑛-𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑞 + 𝛼2𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑠𝑞 + 𝛼3𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑞 + 𝛼4𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐶𝐷𝐼
+ 𝛼5𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐶𝐷𝐼 × 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑠𝑞 + 𝛼6𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐶𝐷𝐼 × 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑞 + 𝛼7𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑞
+ 𝛼8𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡-𝑡𝑜-𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑞 + 𝛼9𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑞 + 𝛼10𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑞 + 𝛼14𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑞
+ 𝛼15𝐿𝑛(𝐴𝑔𝑒)𝑞 + 𝛼16𝑀&𝐴 + 𝛼14𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝛼15𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀𝑞+1,𝑞+4 
 
Fopi (Future Operating Income): Earnings per Share from operation which is summed over four quarters starting from quarter q+1; 
newCDI: an indicator variable that equals 1 if the observation falls between Q1 2010 and Q2 2011 (inclusive), and 0 otherwise; GAAP 
Earnings: basic EPS before extraordinary items and discontinued operations; Non-GAAP Earnings: I/B/E/S reported actual (basic) 
earnings per share; Special Item: Operating Income less GAAP Earnings; Other Exclusion: Total Exclusions less Special Items; 
newCDI: an indicator variable that equals 1 if the observation falls between Q1 2010 and Q2 2011 (inclusive), and 0 otherwise; Sales 
Growth: quarter-over-quarter increase in sales, on a per share; Market-to-book: price/(common equity/outstanding shares); Ln(Total 
Assets): Log of total assets in quarter q; Earnings Volatility: standard deviation of return on assets over at least six of the previous eight 
quarters; Loss: an indicator variable equal to 1 if earnings before extraordinary items for the quarter is less than 0, and 0 otherwise; 
Ln(Age): Log of the number of years since the company first appeared in Compustat. 
All continuous variables (with the exception of the lower bound of age) are winsorized at 1 percent and 99 percent. 
***, **, and * represent two-sided p-values of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1, respectively. Errors are clustered by CUSIP. 
 
 Dependent Variable                                                      Future operating Income 
  [1]  [2]  [3] 
   Full Sample 
 

















Intercept 𝛼0 -0.250   -0.60 
 
0.739   0.96 
 
-0.107   -0.81 
Non-GAAP Earnings 𝛼1 2.350 *** 38.86 
 
2.300 *** 28.75 
 
2.347 *** 28.38 
Special Item 𝛼2 -0.191   -1.62 
 
-0.186   -1.48 
 
-0.188   -1.26 
Other Exclusion 𝛼3 -1.024 *** -8.06 
 
-0.913 *** -7.45 
 
-0.948 *** -5.88 
newCDI 𝛼4 -0.100 *** -3.17 
 
-0.182 *** -3.47 
 
-0.157 *** -4.03 
newCDI×Special Item 𝛼5 -0.310 * -1.65 
 
-0.257   -1.35 
 
-0.155   -0.68 
newCDI×Other Exclusion 𝛼6 0.586 *** 3.46 
 
0.561 *** 3.24 
 
0.697 *** 3.25 
Sales Growth 𝛼7 0.044 *** 5.65  0.035 *** 3.37  0.053 *** 5.06 
Market-to-Book 𝛼8 0.022 *** 8.54  0.026 *** 7.16  0.044 *** 7.93 
Ln(Total Assets) 𝛼9 0.128 *** 15.49  0.151 *** 10.99  0.138 *** 10.35 
Earnings Volatility 𝛼10 -0.021   -0.54 
 
-0.102 * -1.73 
 
-1.228 ** -2.47 
Loss 𝛼11 -0.110 *** -3.56 
 
-0.097 ** -2.25 
 
-0.076   -1.63 
Ln(Age) 𝛼12 0.138 *** 6.89 
 
0.081 ** 2.33 
 
0.151 *** 4.32 
 
 
           Time Fixed Effect  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  68,567   24,612   38,078 









The Effect of Board Independence on the Quality of Non-GAAP Exclusions  
 
The sample period covers the first quarter of 2006 through the fourth quarter of 2010 (2006 Q1–2010 Q4).  
 
𝐹𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑞+1,𝑞+4 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑁𝑜𝑛-𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑞 + 𝛼2𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐶𝐷𝐼 + 𝛼3𝑁𝑜𝑛-𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑞
+ 𝜶𝟒𝒏𝒆𝒘𝑪𝑫𝑰 × 𝑵𝒐𝒏-𝑮𝑨𝑨𝑷𝑬𝒙𝒄𝒍𝒖𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒒  + 𝛼5𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑞 + 𝛼6𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡-𝑡𝑜-𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑞
+ 𝛼7𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑞 + 𝛼8𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑞 + 𝛼9𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑞  + 𝛼12𝐿𝑛(𝐴𝑔𝑒)𝑞
+  𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡  + 𝜀𝑞+1,𝑞+4 
 
Fopi (Future Operating Income): Earnings per Share from operation which is summed over four quarters starting from quarter q+1; 
newCDI: an indicator variable that equals 1 if the observation falls between Q1 2010 and Q2 2011 (inclusive), and 0 otherwise; GAAP 
Earnings: basic EPS before extraordinary items and discontinued operations; Non-GAAP Earnings: I/B/E/S reported actual (basic) 
earnings per share; Non-GAAP Exclusions: Non-GAAP Earnings - GAAP Earnings; Special Item: Operating Income less GAAP 
Earnings; Other Exclusion: Total Exclusions less Special Items; newCDI: an indicator variable that equals 1 if the observation falls 
between Q1 2010 and Q2 2011 (inclusive), and 0 otherwise; Sales Growth:  quarter-over-quarter increase in sales, on a per share basis; 
Market-to-book: price/(common equity/outstanding shares); Ln(Total Assets): Log of total assets in quarter q; Earnings Volatility: 
standard deviation of return on assets over at least six of the previous eight quarters; Loss: an indicator variable equal to 1 if earnings 
before extraordinary items for the quarter  is less than 0, and 0 otherwise; Ln(Age): Log of the number of years since the company first 
appeared in Compustat. 
All continuous variables (with the exception of the lower bound of age) are winsorized at 1 percent and 99 percent. 
***, **, and * represent two-sided p-values of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1, respectively. Errors are clustered by CUSIP. 
 
 
Dependnet Variable  Future operating Income 
  [1]   [2] 
  
 High Independence 
(Board Independence 












Intercept 𝛼0 -0.392   -0.66 
 
-1.203 ** -2.30 
Non-GAAP earnings 𝛼1 2.239 *** 26.89 
 
2.643 *** 25.31 
newCDI 𝛼2 -0.142 ** -2.19 
 
-0.224 *** -2.67 
Non-GAAP Exclusions 𝛼3 -0.542 *** -5.73 
 
-0.462 *** -3.78 
newCDI×Non-GAAP Exclusions 𝛼4 0.372 ** 2.46 
 
0.080   0.45 
Sales Growth 𝛼5 0.074 *** 6.03 
 
0.012   0.76 
Market-to-Book 𝛼6 0.024 *** 6.66  0.021 *** 5.02 
Ln(Total Assets) 𝛼7 0.128 *** 9.05 
 
0.164 *** 8.94 
Earnings Volatility 𝛼8 -0.327   -1.37 
 
-1.108 ** -2.26 
Loss 𝛼9 -0.164 *** -3.50 
 
0.015   0.23 
Ln(Age) 𝛼10 0.203 *** 6.21 
 
0.059   1.24 
 
 
       Time Fixed Effect  Yes  Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect  Yes  Yes 
Observations  30,975   12,782 









Probit Regressions of Meeting or Beating Analyst Expectations on Exclusion Variables 
 
 
The sample period covers the first quarter of 2006 through the fourth quarter of 2011 (2006 Q1–2011 Q4).  
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑀𝐵𝐸)𝑞 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐶𝐷𝐼𝑞 + 𝛼2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑞 + 𝛼3𝒏𝒆𝒘𝑪𝑫𝑰 × 𝑷𝒐𝒔𝑬𝒙𝒄𝒍𝑼𝒔𝒆𝑞 + 𝜶𝟒𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡-𝑡𝑜-𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝒒  
+ 𝛼5𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑞 + 𝛼6𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠) + 𝛼7𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑞 + 𝛼8𝑅𝑂𝐴 𝑞 + 𝜀𝑞+1,𝑞+4 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑀𝐵𝐸)𝑞 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑛𝑒𝑤𝐶𝐷𝐼𝑞 + 𝛼2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑞 + 𝛼3𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑞
+ 𝜶𝟒𝒏𝒆𝒘𝑪𝑫𝑰 × 𝑷𝒐𝒔𝑺𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒍𝑰𝒕𝒆𝒎𝑼𝒔𝒆𝒒  + 𝛼5𝒏𝒆𝒘𝑪𝑫𝑰 × 𝑷𝒐𝒔𝑶𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑬𝒙𝒄𝒍𝑼𝒔𝒆𝑞 + 𝛼6𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡-𝑡𝑜-𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑞
+ 𝛼7𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑞 + 𝛼8𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠) 𝑞 + 𝛼9𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑞  + 𝛼12𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑞 + 𝜀𝑞+1,𝑞+4 
 
MBE: an indicator variable equal to one if I/B/E/S actual EPS is greater than the median consensus analyst forecast; newCDI: an indicator 
variable that equals 1 if the observation falls between Q1 2010 and Q2 2011 (inclusive), and 0 otherwise; PosExclUse: an indicator variable 
equal to one if Non-GAAP Exclusions is greater than zero; PosOtherExclUse: an indicator variable equal to one if Other Exclusions is greater 
than zero. PosSpecialItemsUse: an indicator variable equal to one if Special Items are greater than zero. Market-to-book: price/(common 
equity/outstanding shares); Sales Growth: quarter-over-quarter increase in sales, on a per share basis; Ln(Total Assets): Log of total assets in 
quarter q;  Profitable: an indicator variable equal to one if I/B/E/S actual EPS is greater than zero; ROA: GAAP earnings divided by total assets.  
All continuous variables (with the exception of the lower bound of age) are winsorized at 1 percent and 99 percent. 
 ***, **, and * represent two-sided p-values of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable  Prob(MBE)q 
   [1]   [2] 
   Coef.   t   Coef.   t 
Intercept 𝛼0 -0.279 *** -12.08 
 
-0.273 *** -11.79 
newCDI 𝛼1 0.079 *** 6.40 
 
0.078 *** 6.31 
PosExclUse 𝛼2 0.255 *** 17.54 
    PosSpecialItemUse 𝛼3 
    
0.059 *** 2.61 
PosOtherExclUse 𝛼4 
    
0.255 *** 16.36 
newCDI*PosExclUse 𝛼5 -0.078 *** -3.48 
    newCDI*PosSpecialItemUse 𝛼6 
    
-0.025   -0.74 
newCDI*PosOthe ExclUse 𝛼7 
    
-0.069 *** -2.87 
Sales Growth 𝛼8 0.359 *** 17.65  0.357 *** 17.58 
Market-to-Book 𝛼9 0.024 *** 15.94 
 
0.023 *** 15.76 
Ln(Total Assets) 𝛼10 -0.015 *** -5.27 
 
-0.017 *** -5.81 
Profitable 𝛼11 0.744 *** 48.80 
 
0.740 *** 48.54 
ROA 𝛼12 2.689 *** 18.48 
 
2.669 *** 18.29 
 
 
       Observations  71,804   71,804 






APPENDIX A. TIBCO’S non-GAAP disclosure in the 8-K filings on March 26, 2006 
Use of Non-GAAP Financial Information 
TIBCO provides non-GAAP net income and net income per share data as additional measures of its operating results. TIBCO believes that non-
GAAP financial measures of income provide useful information to management and investors regarding certain additional financial and business 
trends relating to the Company’s financial condition and results of operations. For example, the non-GAAP results are an indication of TIBCO’s 
baseline performance before gains, losses or other charges that are considered by management to be outside the Company’s core business 
operational results. In addition, these non-GAAP results are among the primary indicators management uses as a basis for planning for and 
forecasting of future periods. These measures are not in accordance with, or an alternative for, generally accepted accounting principles in the 
United States and may be different from non-GAAP measures used by other companies. 
 
TIBCO Software Inc. 
Non-GAAP Condensed Consolidated Statement of Operations 
(unaudited) 
(in thousands, except per share data) 
  
            Three Months ended 
     
March 5, 
2006    February 27, 2005 
     Non-GAAP (1)   Non-GAAP (1) 
Revenue    $ 114,580   $ 104,146 
Cost of revenue      30,699     25,933 
 
              
Gross profit      83,881     78,213 
Operating expenses:    
  
   
  Research and development      20,855     16,187 
Sales and marketing      37,307     34,121 
General and administrative      8,908     9,800 
 
              
Total operating expenses      67,070     60,108 
Income from operations      16,811     18,105 
Interest and other income, net      3,779     2,455 
 
              
Income before income taxes      20,590     20,560 
Provision for income taxes (2)      8,030     7,813 
 
              
Net income    $ 12,560   $ 12,747 
 
              
   
Net income per share - Basic    $ 0.06   $ 0.06 
 
              
Shares used to compute net income per share - Basic      210,577     214,751 
 
              
Net income per share - Diluted    $ 0.06   $ 0.05 
 
              
Shares used to compute net income per share - Diluted      220,170     233,675 
 
              
  
  
         (1)      The following table summarizes the non-GAAP adjustments:    Three Months ended   
     March 5, 2006     February 27, 2005   
Net income, GAAP    $ 5,601    $ 10,388  
Stock-based compensation      4,587      93  
Amortization of acquired intangibles      3,694      3,516  
Provision for income taxes (2)      (1,322 )    (1,250 ) 
 
                 
Net income, non-GAAP    $ 12,560    $ 12,747  
 
                 
  
(2) The estimated non-GAAP effective tax rate of 39% and 38% have been used for 2006 and 2005 respectively, to adjust the provision for 
income taxes for non-GAAP purposes. 
  
          Three Months ended March 5, 2006   
Net income, GAAP    $ 5,601  
(a) Stock-based compensation      4,587  
(b) Amortization of acquired intangibles      3,694  
(c) Provision for income taxes      (1,322 ) 
 
         
Net income, non-GAAP    $ 12,560  
 
         
  






APPENDIX B. SEC Comment Letter 
 
VIA EDGAR AND FACSIMILE 
 
Securities and Exchange Commission 
100 F Street, N.E. 
Washington, DC 20549 
Attention: Christine Davis 
Re: TIBCO Software Inc. 
Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year Ended November 30, 2005 Filed February 10, 2006 
Form 10-Q for the Fiscal Quarter Ended February 28, 2006 Filed April 14, 2006 
Form 8-K filed March 28, 2006 
File No. 000-26579 
 
Dear Ms. Davis: 
TIBCO Software Inc. (the “Company”) is submitting this letter in response to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s (the “Commission”) letter dated June 15, 2006 (the “Comment Letter”). For your convenience, we have repeated 
your comments 1 through 8 below, and the headings and numbered responses in this response letter correspond to the headings 
and numbered comments contained in the Comment Letter. Please feel free to contact me at the number at the end of this 
response letter with any further questions or comments you may have. 
 
Form 8-K Filed March 28, 2006 
5. We believe your presentation of a non-GAAP statement of operations may create the unwarranted impression to investors 
that the non-GAAP statement of operations has been prepared under a comprehensive set of accounting rules or principles 
while also conveying undue prominence to a statement based on non-GAAP measures. Please remove that presentation, or 
explain to us in reasonable detail why its retention is justified in light of these concerns. As a substitute for this presentation 
format, you may consider presenting only individual non-GAAP measures (i.e. line items, subtotals, etc.) provided each one 
complies with Item 10 of Reg. S-K and the Division of Corporation Finance’s Frequently Asked Questions Regarding Use of 
Non-GAAP Financial Measures, Question 8. 
 
The Company confirms that it has always intended to comply with Item 10 of Regulation S-K for each non-GAAP measure 
presented. In response to the Staff’s comments, the Company has determined that it will not present the table titled “Non- 
GAAP Condensed Consolidated Statement of Operations” in future filings. In addition, the Company will replace the table 
titled “Reconciliation of Condensed Consolidated Statement of Operations to Non-GAAP Condensed Consolidated Statement of 
Operations” with the table titled “Reconciliation of Non-GAAP Measures to GAAP.” Following the presentation of GAAP 
Consolidated Statement of Operations and Balance Sheets, the Company intends to include the table titled “Reconciliation of 
Non-GAAP Measures to GAAP” with a description on why management believes the exclusion of each item from the non- 
GAAP measures provide useful information to investors and the manner in which management uses the non-GAAP measures to 
conduct or evaluate the business. The Company believes that its proposed disclosure enhances the understanding of its financial 
results because it helps investors understand how management assesses the Company’s performance and provides a consistent 
baseline for historical and prospective comparisons. The Company intends to include for future periods where non-GAAP results 
are included the following disclosure in its Forms 8-K:  
 
The Company provides non-GAAP measures for operating income, net income and net income per share data as supplemental 
information regarding the Company’s core business operational performance. The Company believes that these non-GAAP 
financial measures are an indication of the Company’s baseline performance before gains, losses or other charges that are 
considered by management to be outside the Company’s core business operational results. The Company uses core business 
operational results for its internal budgeting and measurement purposes and to develop its perspective and understanding of the 
Company’s performance historically, currently and prospectively. The core business operational results are also used by the 
Company to provide a consistent method of comparison to historical periods and to the performance of competitors and peer 
group companies. Accordingly, management excludes from core business operational results gains and losses on equity 
investments, costs related to formal restructuring plans, non-cash activities, including stock-based compensation related to 
employee stock options, the amortization of purchased intangible assets and charges for acquired in-process research and 
development, and the income tax effects of the foregoing, as well as adjustments for the impact of changes in the valuation 
allowance recorded against the Company’s deferred tax assets. 
 
The Company believes that providing non-GAAP measures that management uses to its investors is useful because it allows 
investors to better understand the Company’s financial performance on a comparative basis for historical and prospective 
performance, as well as to evaluate the Company’s performance using the same methodology and information used by the 





or an alternative for, Generally Accepted Accounting Principles in the United States and may be different from non-GAAP 
measures used by other companies. The non-GAAP adjustments described in this release have historically been excluded by the 
Company from its non-GAAP measures. The non-GAAP adjustments, and the basis for excluding them, are outlined below: 
 
Restructuring Activities  
The Company has incurred restructuring expenses, included in its GAAP presentation of operating expense, primarily due to 
workforce related charges such as payments for severance and benefits and estimated costs of exiting and terminating facility 
lease commitments related to a formal restructuring plan. The Company excludes these items, for the purposes of calculating 
non-GAAP operating income, non-GAAP net income and non-GAAP net income per share, when it evaluates the continuing core 
business operational performance of the Company. The Company believes that these items do not necessarily reflect expected 
future operating expense nor does the Company believe that they provide a meaningful evaluation of current versus past core 
business operational results or the expense levels required to support the Company’s operating plan.  
 
Investment Activities  
The Company records gains or losses on its equity investments based on its pro-rata share of gains or the net losses of the 
investment. These gains or net losses are included in the Company’s GAAP presentation of operating income, net income and net 
income per share. The Company’s core business is not to invest in third parties, and such investments do not constitute a material 
portion of the Company’s assets. The timing and magnitude of gains and losses are unpredictable, as they are inherently based on 
the performance of the third party subject to a particular investment. The Company excludes these items, for the purposes of 
calculating non-GAAP operating income, non-GAAP net income and non-GAAP net income per share, when it evaluates the 
continuing core business operational performance of the Company. The Company believes that these items do not necessarily 
reflect expected future operating expense or income nor does the Company believe that they provide a meaningful evaluation of 
current versus past core business operational results or the expense levels required to support the Company’s operating plan. 
 
Non-Cash Activities 
The Company has incurred stock based compensation expense as determined under SFAS 123R for fiscal year 2006, and under 
APB 25 for earlier comparable periods in its GAAP financial results. The Company excludes this item, for the purposes of 
calculating non-GAAP operating income, non-GAAP net income and non-GAAP net income per share, when it evaluates the 
continuing core business operational performance of the Company, prepares plans and budgets and compares its performance to 
historical periods and other companies. The Company believes that its non-GAAP measures excluding stock based compensation 
expense are more indicative of the Company’s core business operational results, and provide a more reliable trended measure of 
historical and prospective core profitability of the Company. The Company has incurred amortization of intangibles, included in 
its GAAP financial statements, related to various acquisitions the Company has made. Management excludes these items, for the 
purposes of calculating non-GAAP operating income, non-GAAP net income and non-GAAP net income per share, when it 
evaluates continuing core business operational performance of the Company. The Company believes that eliminating this 
expense from its non- 
GAAP measures is useful to investors as a measurement when comparing historical and prospective results and comparing such 
results to competitors and peer group companies because it more clearly describes the Company’s core operational business 
results, since the amortization of intangibles will vary if and when the Company makes additional acquisitions. 
 
Acquired In Process Research and Development 
The Company recorded charges for acquired in-process research and development (“IPR&D”), included in its GAAP 
presentation of operating expense, in connection with its acquisitions. These amounts were expensed on the acquisition dates as 
the acquired technology had not yet reached technological feasibility and had no future alternative uses. There can be no 
assurance that acquisition of businesses, products or technologies in the future will not result in substantial charges for acquired 
IPR&D. Accordingly, acquired IPR&D are non-recurring and generally unpredictable. The Company believes that eliminating 
this expense, for the purposes of calculating non-GAAP operating income, non-GAAP net income and non-GAAP net income 
per share, is useful to investors. 
 
6. We also note that your presentation lacks substantive disclosure that addresses various disclosures in Question 8 of the FAQ. 
For example, your disclosures do not explain the economic substance behind your decision to use the measures, why you believe 
the measures provide investors with valuable insight into your operating results, or why it is useful to an investor to segregate 
each of the items for which adjustments are made. Additionally, you do not provide any discussion regarding the material 
limitations associated with each measure or the manner in which you compensate for such limitations. Note that we believe that 
detailed disclosures should be provided for each adjustment to your GAAP results and each non-GAAP measure. Further, please 
note that you must meet the burden of demonstrating the usefulness of any measure that excludes recurring items, especially 
if the non-GAAP measure is used to evaluate performance. 
 






7. Please explain to us why you believe the exclusion of certain expenses helps focus on “core business operational results”. 
In this regard, we note that you should specifically define any reference to “core business operational results” as companies and 
investors may differ as to what this term represents and how it should be determined. 
 
The Company respectfully advises the Staff that the Company believes that non-GAAP financial measures of operating income, 
net income and net income per share are useful measures for the purposes of evaluating the Company’s historical and current 
baseline financial performance as well as its performance relative to its competitors and peer group companies. Accordingly, 
management excludes from core business operational results items that management does not believe are reflective of the 
Company’s baseline performance, such as gains and losses on equity investments, costs related to formal restructuring plans, 
non-cash activities, including stock-based compensation related to employee stock options, the amortization of purchased 
intangible assets, charges for acquired in-process research and development and reduction of goodwill and other long-lived 
assets, and the income tax effects of the foregoing and the impact of changes in the valuation allowance recorded against the 
Company’s deferred tax assets. Specific definitions of those items the Company has historically excluded from its core business 
operational results are included in the Company’s response in Item 5. 
 
8. We note that you use a 28% tax rate, which differs from your GAAP tax rate. Please explain to us why you believe this non-
GAAP tax rate is more appropriate and explain to us how this rate differs from your GAAP tax rate. 
  
The Company respectfully advises the Staff that the non-GAAP tax rate the Company reported was actually 39%. This rate 
reflects adjustments for the tax effects of discrete items excluded from the Company’s core business operational results which 
included amortization of intangibles, stock-based compensation expense and the impact of changes in valuation allowance 
recorded against the Company’s deferred tax assets. These adjustments are made by the Company to its GAAP results to arrive at 
non-GAAP financial measures for evaluating the performance of its core business operational results. Consequently, the 
Company also adjusted its GAAP tax rate to determine the non-GAAP tax rate applicable to its core business operational results. 
It is also management’s belief that the non-GAAP tax rate provides a more accurate and reliable measure of the Company’s 
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The Effect of Voluntary Clawback Adoption on Non-GAAP Reporting 
1. Introduction 
This paper examines the effect of voluntary adoption of clawback provisions on firms’ 
non-GAAP earnings disclosure practices. Firms adopt clawbacks to recover executive 
compensation based on financial performance that is subsequently invalidated, most typically 
through an earnings restatement. Clawbacks are intended to discourage intentional misstatement 
of accounting information by imposing an ex post penalty on managers, and recent studies 
document that financial reporting quality improves after their voluntary adoption (see, e.g., 
Chan, Chen, Chen, and Yu, 2012; deHaan, Hodge, and Shevlin, 2013). This evidence suggests 
that adopting clawback provisions increases the costs associated with misstating earnings defined 
under generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). However, it is possible that managers 
adapt to this more restrictive reporting environment by disclosing financial performance 
measures that would not be subject to restatement, such as non-GAAP earnings. I therefore 
examine whether the voluntary adoption of clawback provisions affects the frequency and 
quality of firms’ non-GAAP earnings disclosures. 
Non-GAAP (or “pro forma”) earnings disclosures are alternative earnings performance 
measures provided by individual firms that attempt to measure “core” earnings form reported 
GAAP earnings. Prior research finds that non-GAAP earnings figures are, on average, more 
value relevant than GAAP earnings (Bradshaw and Sloan 2002; Bhattacharya, Black, 
Christensen, and Larson 2003), but there is also evidence that these disclosures are used 





items excluded from non-GAAP earnings are predictive of future performance, which suggests 
that these expenses are recurring and opportunistically excluded from core or permanent 
earnings. In addition, managers appear to use non-GAAP earnings disclosures to meet earnings 
benchmarks (Lougee and Marquardt 2004; Black and Christensen 2009). 
While prior research shows that clawback provisions improve GAAP earnings quality, it 
is unclear how voluntarily adopting these provisions might affect the frequency of non-GAAP 
earnings disclosures. Lougee and Marquardt (2004) find that the likelihood of non-GAAP 
disclosure is inversely related to GAAP earnings quality, which suggests that the frequency of 
non-GAAP disclosures will decrease as GAAP earnings quality improves following voluntary 
clawback adoption. Alternatively, clawbacks serve as an ex ante deterrent of GAAP violations 
by increasing managers’ costs of manipulating GAAP earnings for their personal benefit. 
Managers may compensate for this perceived reduction in GAAP reporting discretion by 
voluntarily releasing non-GAAP earnings measures to investors, which suggests that voluntary 
clawback adoption will increase the frequency of non-GAAP disclosure. 
The effect of clawback adoption on the quality of non-GAAP earnings is similarly 
ambiguous. On the one hand, Frankel, McVay, and Soliman (2011) find that better corporate 
governance is associated with higher quality non-GAAP earnings disclosures. Since clawbacks 
are generally viewed as improving governance practices, one might expect an improvement in 
the quality of non-GAAP reporting following their adoption. On the other hand, managers may 
respond to the increased costs of GAAP earnings misstatements by using non-GAAP earnings 
more aggressively since these performance measures are not subject to clawback provisions.27 
                                                            
27Palmrose and Scholz (2004) examine the association between the restatements of non-GAAP reporting and legal 
consequences, providing evidence that core and pervasive restatements increase the probability of lawsuits. They 





The quality of non-GAAP earnings may consequently decrease following a voluntary adoption 
of clawback provisions.  
To examine these effects, I estimate a probit model of the likelihood of non-GAAP 
earnings disclosure before and after voluntary clawback adoption using two different samples: 
(1) a sample consisting of only clawback adopters and (2) a sample where clawback adopters are 
matched with non-adopters based on a propensity score matched sample (1:1 matching). The 
propensity-score matching procedure mitigates concerns over omitted variables that are 
correlated with both clawback adoption decisions and non-GAAP reporting. In addition, 
propensity-score matching allows me to use a difference-in-differences research design to 
analyze changes in non-GAAP reporting before and after clawback adoption. After controlling 
for other determinants of non-GAAP earnings disclosure, I find that firms are significantly more 
likely to disclose non-GAAP earnings after they voluntarily adopt clawback provisions.  
To investigate whether the increase in non-GAAP reporting frequency is motivated by a 
desire to better inform investors or to mislead investors, I examine the quality of non-GAAP 
earnings exclusions. Following Doyle, Lundholm and Soliman (2003) and Kolev, Marquardt, 
and McVay (2008), a higher quality exclusion is defined as being more transitory and having no 
predictive power for future operating income. I find that there has been a significant decrease in 
the quality of non-GAAP exclusions after a firm voluntarily adopts clawback provisions; i.e., 
future operating income is more negatively correlated with non-GAAP exclusions after adopting 
clawback provisions. An increase in non-GAAP reporting frequency combined with a decrease 
in non-GAAP exclusion quality is consistent with greater opportunistic use of non-GAAP 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
non-GAAP earnings (pro forma earnings) refers to an earnings metric a firm calculates by excluding or including 
certain items from GAAP earnings. Implicit in this is the assumption that non-GAAP earnings, as defined in this 
paper, are not subject to restatements. Therefore, manipulating non-GAAP earnings by excluding certain expenses 





earnings disclosures after initiation of voluntary clawback provisions, an outcome contrary to the 
intended objective of clawback adoption. This suggests that an increase in the cost of 
manipulating GAAP earnings relative to non-GAAP earnings can cause opportunistically-
motivated managers to shift their focus from GAAP to non-GAAP earnings.  
I confirm this interpretation by performing two additional cross-sectional analyses.  If 
voluntary clawback adoption results in an increase in the opportunistic use of non-GAAP 
disclosure, these effects should be relatively more pronounced for firms with greater incentives 
for opportunistic reporting. I proxy for these incentives by determining whether the firm has an 
unusually high level of net operating assets (NOA) on its balance sheet and whether the firm has 
failed to meet or beat analyst forecasts of earnings, as Doyle et al. (2013) find that managers are 
more likely to use non-GAAP earnings opportunistically in both of these situations.  I find that 
the deterioration in the quality of non-GAAP exclusions following voluntary clawback adoption 
is significantly greater when existing NOA is high and when firms miss analyst forecasts, 
consistent with an increase in the opportunistic use of non-GAAP reporting. 
These results contribute to existing literature in several ways. First, the study contributes 
to the growing literature on the consequences of clawback adoption. Prior research has 
documented significant benefits associated with clawback adoption.  For example, Chan, Chen, 
Chen, and Yu (2012) find a reduction in the frequency of accounting restatements and higher 
earnings response coefficients after voluntary clawback adoption, and deHaan, Hodge, and 
Shevlin (2012) report reductions in firms’ benchmark beating behavior and the dispersion of 
analyst forecasts. In addition, Iskandar-Datta and Jia (2013) find that clawback adoption 
enhances firm value for firms with a history of prior restatements, suggesting that investors view 





the frequency and a decrease in the quality of non-GAAP earnings, consistent with an increase in 
the opportunistic use of non-GAAP disclosure following clawback adoption. To my knowledge, 
this is the first empirical evidence related to any costs associated with voluntary adoption of 
clawbacks.  
My findings also extend the literature on non-GAAP reporting by providing new 
evidence that managers use GAAP and non-GAAP earnings as substitutes to achieve their 
financial reporting objectives. For example, Doyle et al. (2013) find that managers are more 
likely to shift to non-GAAP earnings to meet analyst forecasts when the cost of within-GAAP 
earnings management is high, as indicated by high levels of existing income-increasing accruals 
on the balance sheet (Barton and Simko 2002). Similarly, my results indicate that when 
clawbacks increase the cost of within-GAAP earnings management, managers are more likely to 
opportunistically disclose non-GAAP earnings figures.  These findings also complement those of 
Kolev et al. (2008), who document a substitution effect between non-GAAP earnings exclusions 
and within-GAAP classification shifting on the income statement. 
 My findings also have practical implications for both corporate boards and regulators as 
they consider introducing clawback provisions into firms’ financial reporting environments. This 
point is especially relevant as the mandatory clawback provisions required by the Dodd-Frank 
Act are soon to take effect. While one cannot assume that the effects I observe on non-GAAP 
reporting will apply to all adopters, my findings do suggest that mandatory clawback adoption 
may result in a shift toward more opportunistic use of non-GAAP earnings disclosure. 
Regulators may need to consider more comprehensive ways to enhance overall financial 





The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides institutional background on 
clawback provisions, and Section 3 outlines my hypothesis development. Section 4 presents the 
sample selection procedure and descriptive statistics. In Section 5, I discuss the research design 
and the empirical results. I perform additional tests in Section 6 and conclude the paper in 






2. Background on Clawback Provisions 
Clawback provisions allow a firm to recover incentive-based compensation from 
corporate executives upon the occurrence of some predefined event, typically an earnings 
restatement. The prevalence of voluntary clawback adoption has grown rapidly since 2002, when 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was enacted. The primary objective of SOX was to rebuild 
investors’ confidence in capital markets by imposing stricter disclosure requirements about a 
firm’s internal control system, and Section 304 of SOX authorized the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) to enforce compensation recovery when a publicly traded firm restated 
financial statements due to misconduct.  More specifically, Section 304 requires CEOs and CFOs 
to return to their firms any bonus and incentive-based compensation received and any profits 
realized from selling their stock within 12 months of accounting restatements due to material 
noncompliance with financial reporting requirements as a result of misconduct.28  More recently, 
Section 954 of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 requires all public companies to adopt a provision 
for the recovery of incentive-based compensation in excess of what would have been paid under 
restated financial statements. However, while only CEOs and CFOs are subject to clawback 
provisions under SOX, the Dodd-Frank Act broadens its coverage to all executive officers as 
defined in Rule 3b-7 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, including the CEO and other 
officers who are involved in the process of policy-making within the firm. 
                                                            
28  There was some controversy over whether Section 304 of SOX would be effective in improving investor 
confidence. For example, Fried and Shilon (2011) argue that the clawback provisions under SOX are unlikely to be 
deployed, resulting in a reduced ex ante deterrent effect, because they are excessively punitive, and Chan et al. 
(2012) observe that the SEC did not effectively utilize Section 304 until July 2009. On the other hand, Zheng (2013) 
investigates whether the clawback provisions under SOX are related to the likelihood of accounting misstatement 
and CEO compensation structures.  He finds that the correlation between the likelihood of a misstatement and CEO 
in-the-money option value significantly decreases, suggesting that SOX clawback provisions have effectively 






Unlike the recovery provisions described above under SOX or Dodd-Frank, a firm-
initiated clawback is a contractual provision that requires employees to repay compensation 
when specific events occur, typically one of following three categories: (1) performance-based; 
(2) fraud-based; and (3) non-compete and restrictive covenants. Performance-based clawback 
provisions are applicable to all executives who are awarded incentive-based compensation based 
on misstated financial statements. Fraud-based clawback provisions apply only to executives 
who committed fraudulent activities or misconduct which subsequently led to restatements. 
Clawback provisions often include restrictive covenants non-compete and non-solicitation 
clauses, allowing firms to recover compensation from employees. The most common type of 
clawback provision is fraud-based (47%), followed by performance-based (34%) (Davis-Friday, 
Fried, and Jenkins 2013).  
An increasing number of public firms have voluntarily adopted clawback provisions to 
recoup performance-based executive compensation based upon financial statements that are 
subsequently deemed to be misstated. For example, according to the Corporate Library database, 
in 2003 only 14 companies had voluntarily adopted clawback provisions. By the year 2008, 295 
out of 2,121 companies (14%) disclosed that they had voluntarily adopted clawbacks. This 
increase in the prevalence of voluntary clawback adoption, coupled with eventual mandatory 
clawback adoptions under Dodd-Frank, naturally raises the question of how clawback adoption 






3. Hypothesis Development 
Prior research has examined the consequences of voluntary clawback adoption on various 
aspects of firms’ financial reporting environments.29 For example, Chan et al. (2012), deHaan et 
al. (2013), and Chen et al. (2013) all report evidence that the incidence of restatements declines 
following voluntary clawback adoption.  Consistent with auditors’ perception that clawback 
adopters have lower audit risk, Chan et al. (2012) report that auditors charge lower audit fees and 
issue their reports on a more timely basis, and deHaan et al. (2013) report a decrease in 
unexplained audit fees.  Both of these studies also provide evidence that firms’ earnings response 
coefficients increase following clawback adoption. In addition, deHaan et al. (2013) and Chen et 
al. (2013) report declines in earnings management, as measured by abnormal accruals, and an 
increase in CEO pay-performance sensitivity following clawback adoption.  In sum, the evidence 
from prior research is consistent with an overall improvement in the quality of firms’ financial 
reporting under GAAP following clawback adoption. 
I extend the literature on the consequences of voluntary adoption of clawback provisions 
by empirically examining the effect of clawbacks on the frequency and quality of non-GAAP 
earnings disclosures. Upon first consideration, it is not obvious that clawback adoption would 
have any significant effect on non-GAAP reporting practices since non-GAAP earnings are 
subjectively defined, are not audited, and are not subject to restatement. Thus, reporting a non-
GAAP earnings figure that selectively excludes certain expenses could not trigger a clawback of 
executive compensation, however opportunistically the non-GAAP earnings figure might be 
defined by firm managers. 
                                                            
29 A few studies examine the determinants of clawback adoption decision. Brown et al. (2013) find that the firm 
size, CEO duality, extraordinary M&A bonus, goodwill impairments, and accounting restatements are associated 
with clawback adoption decisions. Barbenko et al. (2013) find that prior executive misbehavior, the governance 





However, prior research has linked non-GAAP reporting to the relative informativeness 
of GAAP earnings, thus any improvement in GAAP earnings quality resulting from clawback 
adoption may have an indirect effect on the frequency and quality of non-GAAP earnings 
disclosures. Alternatively, the very fact that non-GAAP disclosures are not subject to clawback 
provisions may affect the relative usefulness of non-GAAP disclosure as a tool to potentially 
mislead investors.  I explore both of these possibilities in developing my hypotheses. 
3.1 The Effect of Clawback Adoptions on the Frequency of Non-GAAP Disclosure  
It is well-known that there are two competing incentives underlying the disclosure of 
non-GAAP earnings. The first is that managers want to inform investors by providing them with 
a measure of core earnings that is likely to persist in the future. Managers therefore remove non-
recurring items from GAAP earnings to better communicate firm performance. Consistent with 
this motivation, Bradshaw and Sloan (2002) and Bhattacharya et al. (2003) report that non-
GAAP earnings are more value relevant than GAAP earnings. In addition, Lougee and 
Marquardt (2004) find that the likelihood of non-GAAP earnings disclosure is inversely related 
to GAAP earnings quality and that investors view non-GAAP earnings as more useful when 
GAAP earnings informativeness is low. If managers are using non-GAAP earnings informatively 
and if clawback adoption improves GAAP reporting quality, as documented in the prior literature, 
then managers may feel less need to provide investors with an alternative measure of firm 
performance through non-GAAP disclosure. This line of reasoning suggests that voluntary 
adoption of clawback provisions may result in a decrease in the frequency of non-GAAP 
earnings disclosure.  
An alternative motivation for releasing non-GAAP earnings is that managers use these 





disclosures are used to meet or beat earnings benchmarks that cannot be reached via GAAP (see, 
e.g., Doyle et al. 2013; Black and Christensen 2009; Heflin and Hsu 2008). Prior research has 
also documented that recurring expenses are often excluded from non-GAAP earnings to inflate 
perceptions of firms’ recurring earnings (see Doyle et al. 2003; Black and Christensen 2009).  
Because clawbacks increase the managerial costs of misstating GAAP earnings, thereby reducing 
managerial perceptions of reporting discretion under GAAP, managers may be more likely to 
attempt to reach financial reporting goals through opportunistic disclosure of non-GAAP 
earnings. This scenario suggests that the frequency of non-GAAP disclosure will increase after 
voluntary clawback adoption. 
However, voluntary adoption of clawbacks may signal the board’s commitment to 
improving the financial reporting environment overall. Managers with opportunistic motives 
may be discouraged from using non-GAAP earnings due to an expectation of heightened 
monitoring by the boards following clawback adoption, resulting in a decrease in the frequency 
of non-GAAP disclosure.  
A further possibility is that “altruistic” managers (i.e., those who use non-GAAP earnings 
to better inform investors) may use non-GAAP earnings more frequently to communicate core 
earnings to compensate for a perceived reduction in reporting discretion under GAAP after 
clawback adoption. This suggests that the frequency of non-GAAP earnings disclosure will 
increase after clawback adoption.  
Finally, it is also possible that clawback adoption does not change managerial behavior 
regarding non-GAAP disclosure if the adoption of clawback provisions is merely a signal of a 
firm’s existing reporting quality. The signaling theory suggests that firms with high reporting 





quality to stakeholders (Chan et al. 2012). Firms with high reporting quality are less likely to be 
adversely affected by clawback adoption because managers in those firms are less likely to use 
non-GAAP earnings disclosures opportunistically. To the extent that firms with higher financial 
reporting quality voluntarily adopt clawback provisions as a credible signal, managers are 
unlikely to change their non-GAAP reporting patterns. In addition, since non-GAAP earnings are 
not subject to restatement, managers may have little incentive to change their non-GAAP 
reporting practicing after clawback adoption. 
I therefore make no directional prediction with regard to changes in the frequency of non-
GAAP earnings disclosure after a firm voluntarily adopts clawback provisions and present the 
first hypothesis in null form: 
H1: The voluntary adoption of clawback provisions has no effect on the frequency of 
non-GAAP earnings disclosure. 
3.2 The Effect of Clawback Adoptions on the Quality of Non-GAAP Exclusions 
 Prior literature on non-GAAP disclosure assesses the quality of non-GAAP earnings by 
investigating whether non-GAAP exclusions have implications for future performance (see 
Doyle et al. 2003). Managers who disclose non-GAAP earnings to better inform investors are 
likely to exclude items only if those items are transitory, so that non-GAAP measures better 
reflect core earnings. If excluded items are transitory, they will have no predictive power for 
future performance; thus “high quality” non-GAAP exclusions are those that have no association 
with future performance. On the other hand, managers who attempt to mislead investors are more 
likely to exclude recurring items from non-GAAP earnings; thus “low quality” non-GAAP 





As with H1, voluntary adoption of clawback provisions could arguably increase or 
decrease the quality of non-GAAP earnings exclusions. Managers who are opportunistically 
motivated may compensate for the increased costs of manipulating GAAP earnings by excluding 
more recurring items from non-GAAP earnings, resulting in lower quality of exclusions. For 
example, Doyle, Jennings, and Soliman (2013) find that managers are more likely to use shift 
towards the use of non-GAAP earnings to meet analyst forecasts when the cost of within-GAAP 
earnings management is high, as indicated by high levels of existing income-increasing accruals 
on the balance sheet (Barton and Simko 2002). Clawback adoption could induce similar behavior 
by managers.  
However, clawback adoption may signal firms’ commitment to carefully monitor all 
aspects of financial reporting, including non-GAAP disclosures, and prior research has shown 
that the quality of non-GAAP exclusions is positively correlated with the strength of corporate 
governance (see Frankel et al. 2011). This suggests that managers may respond to an 
improvement in corporate governance structure by increasing the quality of non-GAAP 
exclusions after clawback adoption, regardless of their motivations for non-GAAP disclosure. 
Therefore, the second hypothesis is presented in null form: 
H2: The voluntary adoption of clawback provisions has no effect on the quality of non-
GAAP earnings exclusions.  
3.3 Joint Interpretation of Hypothesis Test Results 
While clawback adoption may affect the frequency or quality of non-GAAP reporting, it 
is necessary to view the results from both hypothesis tests collectively before drawing any 
inferences regarding the overall effect of clawbacks on non-GAAP reporting. There are four 





increases; (2) frequency increases but quality decreases; (3) frequency decreases but quality 
increases; and (4) both frequency and quality decrease.30 I interpret these four outcomes as 
follows: 
Case 1. More frequent and higher quality non-GAAP disclosure is consistent with an 
increase in the ‘altruistic’ (or ‘informative’) use of non-GAAP reporting.  
 
Case 2. More frequent but lower quality non-GAAP disclosure is consistent with an 
increase in the ‘opportunistic’ use of non-GAAP reporting. 
 
Case 3.  Less frequent but higher quality non-GAAP disclosure is consistent with a 
decrease in the ‘opportunistic’ use of non-GAAP reporting. 
 
Case 4.  Less frequent and lower quality non-GAAP disclosure is consistent with a 
decrease in the ‘altruistic’ (or ‘informative’) use of non-GAAP reporting. 
These interpretations are summarized in Figure 1. 
  
                                                            
30 For simplicity, I omit cases where there is no change in the frequency or quality of non-GAAP reporting. 
Instances of no change in frequency accompanied an increase (decrease) in quality would be consistent with an 
increase in altruistic (opportunistic) non-GAAP reporting. Instances of no change in quality accompanied by an 





4. Sample Selection Criteria and Data Description 
My basic empirical approach, which closely aligns with that of deHaan et al. (2012) and 
Chan et al. (2012), is as follows. I match each clawback adopter to a non-adopting control firm 
using propensity score matching and then perform a difference-in-differences analysis to assess 
pre- versus post-adoption changes in non-GAAP reporting.  The difference-in-differences design 
controls for both cross-sectional and temporal differences between my treatment and control 
firms, and propensity score matching helps me to further eliminate cross-sectional differences 
between the two groups, especially those that may affect or are correlated with the likelihood of 
clawback implementation or non-GAAP reporting. 
  To identify my treatment sample of clawback adopters, I follow Chan et al. (2012) and 
obtain clawback adoption data and other corporate governance characteristics from the Corporate 
Library, which covers firms in the Russell 3000 Index.  I initially identify 297 non-regulated 
firms as having voluntarily adopted clawback provisions during my sample period from 2005 to 
2009. I exclude financial firms from the sample because the majority of them mandatorily 
adopted clawback provisions under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) of 
2008.31  I then hand-collect more detailed information regarding firms’ clawback provisions 
from their proxy statements filed with the SEC.  
The source of non-GAAP earnings data warrants careful consideration. In contrast to the 
prior literature on non-GAAP reporting, which tends to employ either manager-adjusted non-
GAAP earnings collected from firms’ press releases (e.g., Bhattacharya et al. 2003, Lougee and 
Marquardt 2004) or I/B/E/S actual earnings as a proxy for non-GAAP earnings (e.g., Bradshaw 
                                                            
31 Financial institutions that received TARP funding automatically adopted clawback provisions under EESA of 
2008. In addition, financial firms were subject to several additional provisions mandated by the Treasury 





and Sloan 2002, Doyle et al. 2003, Heflin and Hsu 2008, Kolev et al. 2008) as their data source, 
my research design employs both measures.  In my preliminary analysis, where I use propensity 
score matching to identify control firms for my sample of voluntary clawback adopters, I include 
I/B/E/S actual earnings as one of many potential determinants of clawback adoption. This design 
choice allows me to use the widest sample possible when searching for appropriate control firms. 
However, in the main tests of H1 and H2, I use manager-adjusted non-GAAP earnings 
information collected from firms’ earnings announcements (as filed in Form 8-K with the SEC). 
This latter design choice is especially important, as it ensures that the non-GAAP disclosures I 
am examining are solely the result of managerial decision-making and are uncontaminated by 
analyst adjustments to reported earnings (e.g., Gu and Chen 2004) 
I obtain data for the propensity matching procedure and for hypothesis tests from several 
sources. Financial data are obtained from the Unrestated Quarterly Compustat File, and non-
GAAP earnings information is obtained from both I/B/E/S and firms’ Form 8-K filings with the 
SEC. Auditor and accounting restatement information are obtained from Audit Analytics. I 
match quarterly Compustat, I/B/E/S, and 8-K data with annual data from Audit Analytics and the 
Corporate Library based on the fiscal year; I perform several sensitivity tests regarding this 
research design choice in Section 6.  
After eliminating firms that do not have the requisite data, the treatment sample consists 
of 256 clawback adopters out of 2,238 firms covered in the Corporate Library. Panel A of Table 
1 presents the frequency distribution of the sample firms by year. Clawback provisions were 
infrequent in 2005, with only 10 firms having adopted clawback provisions, but I observe sharp 





clawback adoption is consistent with findings in prior research (Chan et al 2012; Barbenko et al. 
2013).  
Panel B of Table 1 compares the means and medians of the sample characteristics of 
clawback adopters (5,208 firm-quarters) versus non-adopters (38,466 firm-quarters).  I include 
variables that have been identified in prior research as important determinants of clawback 
adoption and of non-GAAP disclosure, as well as other firm characteristics. As shown in the 
Panel B, there are significant differences between clawback adopters and non-adopters. 
Clawback adopters are much larger in size than non-adopters: mean (median) total assets of 
clawback adopters are $12,318 ($3,702) million, which is six times larger than the mean of 
$2,380 ($528) million for non-adopters. Clawback adopters also exhibit higher mean sales 
growth rates (0.350 versus 0.300), higher leverage ratios (1.655 versus 1.269), lower earnings 
volatility (0.015 versus 0.030), and lower frequencies of losses (0.138 versus 0.300) than non-
adopters. In addition, clawback adopters exhibit significantly lower market-to-book ratios, less 
negative special item magnitudes, are older, have lower total accruals, and are less likely to 
operate in a high-tech industry. Clawback firms are marginally more likely to restate their 
financial statements during the sample period from 2004 to 2009 (p-value=0.08). Consistent with 
Chan et al. (2012), clawback firms are more likely to hire Big 4 auditors (0.871 versus 0.678), 
have more independent directors on the board (0.852 versus 0.811), and have lower insider 
holdings (0.069 versus 0.169). Clawback adopters disclose non-GAAP earnings more frequently 
than non-adopters (68.8% versus 53.9%). In addition, mean non-GAAP earnings and non-GAAP 
exclusions of clawback adopters are significantly higher than that of non-adopters (0.510 versus 
0.244, and 0.07 versus 0.05 respectively). Mean future operating income (FutureIncome) is also 





 The numerous differences in the firm characteristics of clawback adopters versus non-
adopters, documented above, illustrate why I undertake a propensity-matching approach to my 
analysis. A comparison of clawback adopters with the population of all non-adopting firms is 
unlikely to shed light on the question of whether clawback adoption impacts future non-GAAP 
reporting decisions. I therefore select a single control firm for each clawback adopter by 
matching each adopter to the non-adopting firm with the closest predicted value (i.e, “propensity 
score”) from a logit model estimation of clawback adoption. The dependent variable is an 
indicator variable that equals one if the firm has adopted a clawback provision and zero 
otherwise (Claw) and each of the firm characteristics from Panel B of Table 1 are included as 
independent variables, as follows: 
𝑪𝒍𝒂𝒘𝑞+1 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑞 + 𝛼2 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑞 + 𝛼3 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑞
+ 𝛼4𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑞 + 𝛼5𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑞 + 𝛼6𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑞 + 𝛼7𝑆𝐼𝑞
+ 𝛼8𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑠𝑞 + 𝛼9𝐿𝑛(𝐴𝑔𝑒)𝑞 + 𝛼10𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑞 + 𝛼11𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑞
+ 𝛼12𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒_𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑞 + 𝛼13𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑞 + 𝛼14𝐵𝑖𝑔4𝑞 + 𝛼15%𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑞 + 𝛼16%𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑞
+ 𝛼17𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑞 + 𝛼18𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑞 + 𝛼19𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑞
+  𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀𝑞 
(1) 
 
I estimate equation 1 separately for each year from 2005 to 2009, using all firms with 
available data, to accurately match the pre-adoption characteristics of clawback firms with those 
of non-adopters. More specifically, control firms are matched with clawback adopters based on 
firm characteristics measured in the fourth quarter of the year preceding clawback adoption.32  
Selected non-adopters (control firms) are assigned with “pseudo” adoption years. I require both 
clawback adopters and non-adopters to have at least one observation before and after the 
                                                            
32DeHaan et al. (2012) also match clawback firms with non-adopting firms using propensity-score matching and 
conduct a difference-in-differences analysis. However, they use 2006 year-end data to match 2007, 2008 and 2009 
clawback adopters with non-adopters. In my study, firm characteristics are measured in the prior to voluntary 





clawback adoption year so that I am able to use the difference-in-difference research design. This 
procedure yields 247 pairs of voluntary clawback adopters and non-adopters (1:1 matching).  
Panel A of Table 2 reports the logit estimation results by year. The results reveal that 
large, mature firms with income-decreasing accruals and lower insider holdings are relatively 
more likely to adopt clawback provisions, which is consistent with prior research on the 
determinants of clawback adoption. The non-GAAP reporting variables are very weakly 
associated with clawback adoption, but not in a consistent manner. For example, NonGAAP is 
marginally significantly positive in 2005 and 2008, but NonGAAPExclusion is significantly 
negative in 2006 and 2009, which is a conflicting result. I conclude that past non-GAAP 
reporting practices are not a primary determinant of the decision to adopt clawback provisions. 
Descriptive data related to the success of the propensity matching procedure are 
presented in Panels B and C of Table 2. In Panel B, I compare the means and medians of the 
independent variables in equation (1) for the clawback adopters and their matched controls. As 
shown in Panel B, there are no significant differences in the mean or median of any variable, 
which suggests that the treatment and control firms are well-matched on all of these dimensions.  
Further, in Panel C I find that the mean (median) difference in propensity scores between the two 
groups is -0.002 (0.000) and standard deviation of the difference is 0.005, indicating that there is 
no significant difference between the propensity scores of the treatment firms and their matched 
controls. I conclude that the propensity-matching procedure has succeeded in identifying 
appropriate control firms for each clawback adopter. 
 Next, I hand-collect non-GAAP earnings data for this sample of 247 treatment-control 
matched firm pairs using either 8-K filings or press releases that appeared on the company’s 





manager, rather than analyst, adjustments to GAAP earnings. As shown in Panel D of Table 2, I 
was able to obtain non-GAAP earnings from the 8-K or from a press release for 188 treatment-
control pairs.  
 In Panel E, I compare the means and medians of the independent variables in equation (1) 
for this smaller sample of clawback adopters and their matched controls. I again find no 
significant differences between the treatment and control firms. I use this sample, which relies on 







5. Research Design and Empirical Results 
5.1 The Frequency of Non-GAAP Disclosure and Voluntary Clawback Adoption 
To test H1, I estimate a probit model of the likelihood of disclosing non-GAAP earnings 
in a given quarter. I model the probability of releasing non-GAAP earnings as a function of 
clawback adoption and other determinants of non-GAAP disclosures that have been identified in 
prior literature, as follows:33 










The dependent variable, NonGAAPq, is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm 
discloses non-GAAP earnings in its earnings release for a given quarter and 0 otherwise. After is 
an indicator variable that equals 1 when clawback provisions (or pseudo-assigned clawback 
provisions for non-adopters) are in place and 0 otherwise. Claw is an indicator variable that 
equals 1 if a firm is a voluntary adopter of clawback provisions and 0 otherwise. In Model 1, the 
test sample includes only clawback adopters, and the main variable of interest is After. In Model 
2, which employs the difference-in-differences research design, the test sample includes both 
clawback adopters and their matched control firms, and the main variable of interest is 
After*Claw. Significant coefficients on these variables would provide evidence that clawback 
adoption significantly influences the likelihood of non-GAAP disclosure. 
I include the following control variables in both models: 
Ln(Total Assets) = natural log of total assets 
Intangibles = intangible assets divided by total assets 
Tech = an indicator variable that equals one if firm i is a high-tech industry as 
defined in Francis and Schipper (1999); 
Market to Book = share price/(common equity/outstanding shares); 
                                                            
33Lougee and Marquardt (2004) examine the economic determinants of pro forma reporting; Marques (2006) and 





Sales Growth = quarter-over-quarter increase in sales, on a per share basis 
Leverage = total liabilities divided by book value of stockholders’ equity 
Earnings Volatility = standard deviation of return on assets over at least six of the previous 
eight quarters 
SI = an indicator variable that equals 1 if firm reports a special item in 
quarter q and 0 otherwise 
Bigbath = an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm reports a negative special 
items and negative earnings in the same quarter and 0 otherwise 
Special Items = a dollar amount of special items divided by total assets 
Loss = an indicator variable equal to 1 if earnings before extraordinary items 
for the quarter is less than 0 and 0 otherwise 
QTR4 = an indicator variable equal to 1 for the 4th quarter and 0 otherwise 
Accrual = GAAP earnings less cash from operations divided by total assets 
 
I include Ln(Total Assets) because large firms tend to disclose non-GAAP earnings more 
frequently, suggesting firm size is an important factor to control for systematic difference 
between clawback adopters and non-adopters. Firms with high intangibles or high-tech firms 
have less informative GAAP earnings, and therefore are more likely to release non-GAAP 
earnings than other firms (Lougee and Marquardt 2004). As such, I include the amount of 
intangible assets (Intangibles) and a high-tech indicator variable (Tech). Since growth firms are 
more likely to report non-GAAP earnings, market-to-book ratio (Market to Book) and sales 
growth rate (Sales Growth) are included in the model (Lougee and Marquardt 2004).  
Leverage is included to control for the increased likelihood of earnings management with 
high leverage ratio, which may result in less informative GAAP earnings. Earnings Volatility is 
used as a control because investors tend to demand additional information when earnings are 
volatile (Defond and Hung 2003). Firms reporting large special items are more likely to disclose 
non-GAAP earnings. Following Heflin and Hsu (2008), I include two controls for special items: 
(1) SI, which is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm discloses special items in quarter q 





divided by total assets.34  Since firms that miss earnings benchmarks are more likely to disclose 
non-GAAP earnings, I include a loss indicator variable (Loss) that equals one when GAAP 
earnings before extraordinary items are negative and zero otherwise. In addition, a “big bath” 
indicator variable (Bigbath) is included because firms may be more likely to report non-GAAP 
earnings when it reports a one-time charge that results in an operating loss. Heflin and Hsu 
(2008) find that firms are more likely to disclose non-GAAP earnings in the fourth quarter than 
in other quarters. I therefore include QTR4, an indicator variable equal to 1 for all firm-quarter 
observations that represent the firm’s fourth fiscal quarter, and 0 otherwise.  Finally, I follow 
Doyle et al. (2008) and include total accruals (Accrual) as a control variable. In addition, I 
control for time trends in non-GAAP reporting by including year fixed effects, and standard 
errors are clustered at the firm level. 
The results from estimating Models 1 and 2 are presented in Table 3. When I limit the 
sample to only clawback adopters, as in Model 1, I find that the likelihood of non-GAAP 
earnings disclosure is marginally significantly higher after clawback adoption – the estimated 
coefficient on After is 0.245 (p=0.10). These results indicate that managers are marginally 
significantly more likely to release non-GAAP earnings after voluntarily adopting clawback 
provisions than before.35 However, the results are much stronger when I employ the difference-
in-differences method, as in Model 2. Here, the estimated coefficient on After*Claw is 0.505 and 
highly significant at the 0.01 level, indicating that managers are more likely to report non-GAAP 
earnings after voluntarily adopting clawback provisions, relative to non-adopters. I therefore 
                                                            
34 In addition to these measures, Heflin and Hsu (2008) include the magnitude of industry mean special items 
because it explains significant portion of probability of disclosing non-GAAP earnings. The results are insensitive to 
the inclusion of this variable. 
35 The marginal effect of voluntary clawback adoption in Model 1 is 0.096; i.e., the probability of releasing non-





reject the null hypothesis H1 and conclude that voluntary clawback adoption significantly 
increases the likelihood of non-GAAP earnings disclosure. 
The estimated coefficients on the control variables are generally consistent with my 
expectations. I find the expected positive association between Intangibles or Tech and the 
likelihood of non-GAAP disclosure, suggesting that firms with less informative earnings are 
significantly more likely to report non-GAAP earnings to communicate their performance, and 
Leverage is significantly negatively associated with the probability of non-GAAP disclosure. 
Earnings Volatility is positively associated with the probability of non-GAAP disclosure in 
Model 1 and 2 (2.097 and 5.002, respectively), consistent with the view that higher GAAP 
earnings volatility creates investor demand for additional information to understand fundamental 
performance. As expected, when firms disclose special items (SI) they are more likely to disclose 
non-GAAP earnings. Special Items is also significantly negatively associated with the probability 
of non-GAAP disclosure, indicating that managers are more likely to disclose non-GAAP 
earnings as the magnitude of income-decreasing special items becomes larger.  
In sum, my analysis of non-GAAP disclosure frequency reveals that firms utilize non-
GAAP earnings more frequently after the voluntary adoption of clawback provisions. The 
increases in the frequency of non-GAAP disclosures may be either due to the perceived 
reduction in GAAP reporting discretion following voluntary clawback adoptions or due to an 
improvement in GAAP financial reporting quality, depending on whether the underlying 
managerial motives are to inform or mislead investors. Therefore, I further test the quality of 







5.2 The Quality of Non-GAAP Exclusions and Voluntary Clawback Adoption 
To test H2, I follow prior research and define higher quality non-GAAP exclusions as 
being more transitory and having no predictive power for future operating income (Doyle et al. 
2003; Kolev et al. 2008). As in my tests of H1, I use both the sample of only clawback adopters 




=  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝒊,𝑞 + 𝛼2𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝒊,𝑞                                     
+ 𝛼3𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝒊,𝑞 + 𝛼4𝑨𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒊,𝒒 ∗ 𝑵𝒐𝒏𝑮𝑨𝑨𝑷𝑬𝒙𝒄𝒍𝒖𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊,𝒒




=  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝒊,𝑞 + 𝛼2𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑖 + 𝛼3𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝒊,𝑞
+ 𝛼4𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝒊,𝑞 + 𝛼5𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑖 ∗ 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝒊,𝑞
+ 𝛼6𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝒊,𝑞 ∗ 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝒊,𝑞 + 𝛼7𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝒊,𝑞 ∗ 𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑖




Control variables included in the models are as follows: 
Sales Growth = quarter-over-quarter increase in sales, on a per share basis  
Market to book = price/(common equity/outstanding shares) 
Ln(Total Assets)  = a natural log of total assets in millions and corresponds to quarter q 
Earnings Volatility = standard deviation of return on assets over at least six of the previous 
eight quarters 
Loss = an indicator variable equal to 1 if quarterly earnings before 
extraordinary items is less than 0 and 0 otherwise 
Ln(Age) = natural log of the number of years since a company first appeared in 
Compustat 
Accrual = GAAP earnings less cash flow from operations divided by total 
assets 
 
Following Kolev et al. (2008), I use future operating income (FutureOperatingIncome), 
defined as earnings per share from operations summed over the four quarters beginning with 





future EPS from operations as a dependent variable is that Compustat excludes nonrecurring 
special items but includes recurring items which may be classified as other exclusions from non-
GAAP earnings (Kolev et al. 2008).  
As noted earlier, non-GAAP earnings (NonGAAPEarnings) are hand-collected from press 
releases in the 8-K filings furnished by the SEC, and non-GAAP exclusions 
(NonGAAPExclusions) are defined as non-GAAP earnings less comparable GAAP earnings 
disclosed with non-GAAP earnings in the press releases. Claw and After are as defined in 
Section 5.1. After*NonGAAPExclusion is the main variable of interest in Model 3, and 
After*Claw*NonGAAPExclusion is the main variable of interest in Model 4. Because prior 
research has shown that higher non-GAAP exclusions are associated with lower future 
performance (Doyle et al. 2003, Kolev et al. 2008), positively (negatively) significant 
coefficients on the variables of interest would indicate that the quality of exclusions has 
improved (deteriorated) after clawback adoption.  
To control for potential confounding factors affecting future operating income and non-
GAAP earnings, I include following control variables. Doyle et al. (2003) argue that growing 
firms tend to have lower future operating cash flows because of long-term investment and 
increase in the working capital and finds negative association between sales growth rate and 
future performance. In addition, prior empirical works find that market to book ratio is positively 
correlated to future earnings and non-GAAP reporting decisions. Therefore, I include two 
proxies for sales growth: (1) sales growth rate (Sales Growth) and (2) Market-to-book ratio 
(Market to book). Firm size (Ln(Total Assets)) is included because the costs of opportunistic non-
GAAP reporting may increase with firm size. Firms with less persistent earnings could be 





Marquardt 2004). Therefore, I include Earnings Volatility and Loss to control for this effect. I 
include Ln(Age) to consider potential effects of firm age on non-GAAP exclusions and future 
earnings. Finally, total accruals (Accrual) are included in the model to control for any effects of 
accrual reversal on future earnings, which may affect the association between non-GAAP 
exclusions and future earnings. 
Table 4 presents the results of the exclusion quality tests. The coefficient on 
NonGAAPEarning is 1.654 in Model 3, indicating that reported non-GAAP earnings are not 
perfectly permanent earnings.36 Consistent with Doyle et al. (2003) and Kolev et al (2008), the 
coefficients on NonGAAPExclusion in Models 3 and 4, are significantly negatively (-0.216, and -
0.244, respectively), suggesting that the excluded items are not transitory but likely to recur 
within the next four quarters. 
If voluntary clawback adoption encourages altruistically motivated managers to disclose 
non-GAAP earnings more frequently, the exclusions should be more transitory, suggesting that 
the relation between the exclusions and future operating income is less negative after clawback 
adoptions. On the other hand, if voluntary clawback adoption motivates opportunistically 
motivated managers to disclose non-GAAP earnings more frequently, non-GAAP exclusions 
should be less transitory, suggesting that the relation is more negative after clawback adoption. 
In Model 3, the coefficient on After*NonGAAPExclusion is significantly negative (-
0.410), indicating that exclusions become less transitory after voluntary clawback adoption than 
before it. This suggests that managers use non-GAAP earnings more opportunistically after 
clawback provisions are in place, consistent with the view that clawback provisions impose 
significant costs on managing GAAP earnings and that managers switch their focus toward non-
                                                            
36 Since future earnings are summed over four quarter starting from q+1, the coefficient of 𝛼1 would be 4 if non-





GAAP earnings as an earnings management tool after the adoption. Model 4 presents results 
using the propensity-score matched sample. The coefficient on the main variable of interest, 𝛼8, 
is significantly negative (-0.485), again suggesting that the exclusion becomes less transitory, i.e., 
clawback adopters opportunistically use non-GAAP earnings. 
The signs of coefficients on control variables are generally consistent with prior literature. 
SalesGrowth, firm size (Ln(Total Assets), and firm age are all significantly positively related to 
future operating income, which suggests that large, mature firms with good growth opportunities 
tend to have better future performance. Earnings Volatility is negatively related to future 
operating income, suggesting that firms with less persistent earnings tend to report lower future 
earnings. Finally, total accruals (Accrual) are associated with lower future operating income, 
consistent with the reversal of accruals.  
Taking the results from the frequency (H1) and quality (H2) tests together, the evidence 
indicates that the frequency of non-GAAP disclosure increases and the quality of non-GAAP 
exclusions deteriorates after the voluntary adoption of clawback provisions. This is consistent 
with Case (2) of Figure 1 – i.e., an increase in opportunistic non-GAAP reporting following 
voluntary clawback adoption -- and is not an intended consequence of clawback adoption. While 
prior research has shown that financial reporting benefits follow clawback adoption (deHaan et 
al. 2012; Chan et al. 2012), to my knowledge this is the first evidence to document that any costs 
are significantly associated with clawback adoption.  
Given the potential importance of these findings, I perform additional analyses in the next 
two subsections to confirm that voluntary clawback adoption leads to an increase in 
opportunistic reporting of non-GAAP earnings. 





To confirm my interpretation of increased opportunistic reporting of non-GAAP earnings 
following clawback adoption, I build on the work of Barton and Simko (2002), who argue that 
high levels of NOA partly reflect the extent of previous earnings management and constrain 
managers’ ability to further optimistically bias reported earnings.  Consistent with this argument, 
Doyle et al. (2013) find that managers are more likely to use non-GAAP earnings to meet analyst 
forecasts when NOA is high.  If voluntary clawback adoption results in an increase in the 
opportunistic use of non-GAAP disclosure, I expect the decrease in the quality of non-GAAP 
exclusions following clawback adoption to be more (less) pronounced for clawback adopters 
with high (low) NOA.  
To test this supposition, I dichotomize the sample of clawback adopters by the median 
level of beginning net operating assets (NOA) on their balance sheet and repeat the analysis from 
Table 4.  As shown in Table 5, the estimated coefficient on the main variable of interest, 
After*Claw*NonGAAPExclusion, is significantly negative only for the High NOA column. The 
estimated coefficient is -0.636 and significant at the 0.05 level for the High NOA subsample, 
while the estimated coefficient of -0.154 for the Low NOA subsample is not significantly 
different from zero. In other words, managers tend to exclude more recurring items from non-
GAAP earnings when their ability to manage GAAP earnings is constrained by both a clawback 
provision and high levels of NOA, consistent with opportunistic reporting choices. 
5.4 The Quality of Non-GAAP Exclusions and Meeting or Beating Analyst Forecasts 
 To further confirm that opportunistic non-GAAP reporting increases after voluntary 
clawback adoption, I build on Doyle et al. (2013), who find that managers opportunistically 





leads to an increase in opportunistic non-GAAP reporting, I expect the decrease in the quality of 
non-GAAP exclusions following clawback adoption to be more (less) pronounced for clawback 
adopters that miss (meet or beat) analyst consensus forecasts. 
 To test for this effect, I dichotomize the sample of clawback adopters into cases where 
quarterly GAAP earnings missed the most recent analyst consensus forecast and cases where 
quarterly GAAP earnings would meet or beat the forecast and repeat the analysis from Table 4. 
As shown in Table 5, the estimated coefficient of -0.409 on the main variable of interest, 
After*Claw*NonGAAPExclusion, is marginally significantly negative for the subsample where 
GAAP earnings missed analyst forecasts. In contrast, the estimated coefficient of -0.838 is not 
significantly different from zero.  This suggests that clawback adopters exclude more recurring 
items from non-GAAP earnings when GAAP earnings miss the consensus forecast, which is 






6. Sensitivity Tests 
6.1 The Effect of Types of Clawback Provisions on Non-GAAP Earnings 
I conduct an additional test examining the effect of different types of clawback provisions 
on the frequency and quality of non-GAAP exclusions. There are three conditions which trigger 
clawback provisions: (1) fraudulent activities or misconducts resulting in accounting 
restatements (fraud-based provision), (2) inaccurate numbers or errors upon which calculations 
of incentive compensation were based and consequently are subject to an accounting restatement 
(performance-based provision), and (3) activities which are detrimental to the firms during a 
certain period of time after the termination of employment, or through some other violation of a 
non-compete agreement (non-compete provision). Since a perceived reporting discretion is not 
associated with non-compete clawback provisions, firms adopting non-compete clawback 
provisions do not affect firms’ GAAP reporting discretion. However, fraud-based and 
performance-based clawback provisions subsequently resulting in accounting restatements 
require a firm to claw back incentive compensation which was paid to executives, suggesting 
that fraud- and performance-based clawback provisions are likely to reduce the perceived GAAP 
reporting discretion. Therefore, I expect that the frequency and quality of non-GAAP disclosure 
is related to clawback adoption only when the restatement is required to claw back executive 
compensations.  
I therefore separate the sample into two groups: clawback adopters with fraud-based or 
performance-based clawback provisions and clawback adopters with only non-compete 
provisions. In untabulated analysis, I find a significantly increase in the frequency of non-GAAP 
disclosure only in the sample consisting of firms adopting fraud- or performance-based clawback 





clawback provisions. I find similar results in the exclusion quality tests. That is, I find a 
significant decrease in exclusion quality only in the sample consisting of firms adopting fraud- or 
performance-based clawback provisions, and I find no evidence of a relationship between 
voluntary clawback adoption and the quality of non-GAAP exclusions in a sample consisting of 
firms with non-compete clawback provisions. These results corroborate the conclusion that a 
perceived reduction in GAAP reporting discretion increases managerial focus on non-GAAP 
earnings in response to the increased cost of managing GAAP earnings after the voluntary 
adoption of clawback provisions.  
6.2 The Assumption of the Quarter When Adoption of Clawback Provision Occurs 
In testing H1 and H2, I assume that clawback adoption occurs in the first quarter of the 
adoption year because the exact date upon which each firm adopts clawback provision is not 
disclosed. It can, therefore, be argued that the quarter in which the clawback adoption occurs 
systematically varies across firms. One possible solution for this problem is to identify the exact 
date of clawback adoption from the proxy statements; however, this would require hand-
collecting the annual shareholder meeting dates from proxy statements. I attempt to address this 
issue by assuming that the adoption decision randomly occurs throughout the year for a given 
company. Then I perform the same tests using these randomly assigned quarters as the quarter in 
which adoption occurs, rather than assuming that clawback provisions are adopted from the first 
quarter of the year for all firms. The untabulated results from this analysis are qualitatively 
similar to my main results. 37 
  
                                                            
37 In addition, I conduct same tests with a sample excluding the clawback adoption years. Untabulated results are 






The primary objective of compensation recovery provisions, or clawbacks, is to prevent 
managers from issuing misstated financial numbers in anticipation of higher compensation. 
Under Section 304 of SOX, the SEC is authorized to recover bonus and incentive-based 
compensation received by CEOs and CFOs of companies if the companies restate financial 
statements due to misconduct, and Section 954 of the Dodd-Frank Act also includes provisions 
on the recovery of compensation given to executive officers based on erroneously reported 
information in a prior period. Voluntary adoption of clawback provisions has also gained in 
popularity among public companies.  
Consistent with the objective of clawback provisions, the extant literature documents that 
voluntary adoption of clawback provisions improves financial reporting quality. Investors find 
earnings more informative after clawback adoption. This practice may, however, make GAAP 
earnings more costly for managers to misstate. I argue that an increase in the costs of misstating 
GAAP earnings is likely to change a manager’s non-GAAP reporting behavior because of the 
relatively lower costs for misstating non-GAAP earnings after clawback adoption.  
I find that managers release non-GAAP earnings more frequently after the voluntary 
adoption of clawback provisions. In addition, the quality of non-GAAP exclusions deteriorates 
after these provisions are adopted. These findings are consistent with an increase in opportunistic 
non-GAAP reporting after clawback adoption, suggesting that an increase in the cost of 
manipulating GAAP earnings relative to non-GAAP earnings can cause opportunistically-
motivated managers to shift their focus from GAAP to non-GAAP earnings. Additional cross-





This paper contributes to current literature on voluntary clawback adoption by 
documenting that the improvement in financial reporting quality prescribed by GAAP is 
achieved at the expense of opportunistic use of non-GAAP earnings. It also contributes to the 
literature on non-GAAP earnings by documenting that non-GAAP earnings are a substitute for 









Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Firms by Voluntary Clawback Adoption Status 
Year Non-Adopters Adopters Total # of firms 
2005 2,065 10 2,075 
2006 2,123 36 2,159 
2007 2,124 117 2,241 
2008 2,070 186 2,256 
2009 1,980 256 2,238 
 
 
Panel B: Mean and median differences between voluntary clawback adopters and non-
adopters 









Adopters Z-test  
Total Assets 12,318 2,380 -66.02 *** 
 
3,702 528 -71.07 *** 
Sales Growth 0.350 0.300 -1.83 * 
 
0.319 0.163 -7.92 *** 
Leverage 1.655 1.269 -7.569 ***  1.211 0.766 -31.09 *** 
Earnings Volatility 0.015 0.030 20.72 *** 
 
0.007 0.012 30.40 *** 
Loss 0.138 0.300 24.57 ***  0.000 0.000 24.40 *** 
Market-to-Book 2.957 3.174 3.42 ***  2.479 2.269 -6.00 *** 
Special Items -0.003 -0.004 -2.24 **  0.000 0.000 9.98 *** 
Ln(Age) 3.307 2.722 -64.30 *** 
 
3.367 2.708 -61.47 *** 
Accrual -0.047 -0.033 10.46 *** 
 
-0.039 -0.031 9.30 *** 
Tech 0.248 0.321 10.30 ***  0.000 0.000 10.75 *** 
Restatement 0.144 0.135 -1.74 *  0.000 0.000 -1.74 * 
Big4  0.871 0.678 -29.38 *** 
 
1.000 1.000 -28.59 *** 
%Outside 0.852 0.811 -29.38 *** 
 
0.875 0.833 -34.79 *** 
%Insider 0.069 0.169 33.04 *** 
 
0.029 0.078 48.99 *** 
Non-GAAP 0.688 0.539 -20.36 *** 
 
1.000 1.000 -20.26 *** 
NonGAAPEarnings 0.510 0.244 -37.28 *** 
 
0.430 0.190 -41.13 *** 
NonGAAPExclusion 0.070 0.059 -2.11 ** 
 
0.000 0.000 -4.18 *** 
FutureIncome 2.023 0.928 -37.32 *** 
 
1.745 0.710 -43.82 *** 
          N 5,208 38,466       5,208 38, 466     
 
Total Assets: total assets in quarter q; Sales Growth: quarter-over-quarter increase in sales, on a per share basis; Leverage: Total liabilities 
divided by book value of stockholders’ equity; Earnings Volatility: standard deviation of ROA over past 8 quarters; Loss: an indicator variable 
equal to 1 if earnings before extraordinary items for the quarter is less than 0 and 0 otherwise; Market-to-book: price/(common 
equity/outstanding shares); Special Items: special items reported in Compustat divided by total assets; Ln(Age): Log of the number of years since 
the company first appeared in Compustat; Accruals: GAAP earnings less cash from operations; Tech: an indicator variable that equals one if firm 
i is a high-tech industry as defined in Francis and Schipper (1999); Restatement: an indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm restates its 
financial statements within the prior two years; Tech: an indicator variable that equals one if firm i is a high-tech industry as defined in Francis 
and Schipper (1999); Big4: an indicator variable equal to 1 if a company hires a big4 auditor; %Outside: the percentage of outside 
directors on board; %Insider: the percentage of insiders’ shareholding; Non-GAAP equals 1 if a firm discloses non-GAAP in the quarter and 
0 if not; Non-GAAPEarnings: I/B/E/S reported actual (basic) earnings per share; NonGAAPExclusions: Non-GAAP Earnings - GAAP Earnings; 
FutureIncome: Earnings per Share from operations, summed over four quarters starting from quarter q+1. Test of differences in means and 








Panel A: Logit Estimation Results 
 
𝑪𝒍𝒂𝒘𝑞+1 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑞 + 𝛼2 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑞 + 𝛼3 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑞 + 𝛼4𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑞  + 𝛼5𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑞 + 𝛼6𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑞
+ 𝛼7𝑆𝐼𝑞 + 𝛼8𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑠𝑞 + 𝛼9𝐿𝑛(𝐴𝑔𝑒)𝑞 + 𝛼10𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑞 + 𝛼11𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑞 + 𝛼12𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒_𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑞 + 𝛼13𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑞
+ 𝛼14𝐵𝑖𝑔4𝑞 + 𝛼15%𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑞 + 𝛼16%𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑞 +  𝛼17𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑞 + 𝛼18𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑞
+ 𝛼19𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑞 +  𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 +  𝜀𝑞 
 
Dependent Variable: Claw 2005   2006   2007   2008   2009 
 
Coef   t-stat 
 
Coef   t-stat 
 
Coef   t-stat 
 
Coef   t-stat 
 





-13.35 *** -3.57 
 
-10.11 *** -4.91 
 
-10.29 *** -4.36 
 
-15.13 *** -5.11 




0.716 *** 3.44 
 
0.550 *** 5.20 
 
0.839 *** 6.44 
 
0.685 *** 6.26 



















Leverage 0.979  0.32  -1.517  -0.92  -0.051  -0.07  0.085  0.12  -0.312  -0.46 
















-24.20 ** -2.25 
Loss 2.716 ** 2.00 
 
































SI 0.372  0.01  -24.93  -1.51  12.75  0.90  29.18 ** 2.11  -2.506  -0.40 

























1.111 *** 4.13 
 
0.920 *** 3.15 
 





-9.058 * -1.83 
 
-6.245 *** -2.87 
 






























































2.476 ** 1.99 
 




































-1.636 * -1.67 
 
-3.521 ** -2.33 
 
-2.806 ** -2.45 















NonGAAPEarnings -0.633  -0.54  -0.274  -0.45  -0.522  -1.55  -0.342  -0.92  -0.302  -1.11 
NonGAAPExclusion -1.203  -0.80  -1.602 ** -2.25  0.042  0.09  0.682  1.61  -0.487 * -1.71 
                    



























𝑪𝒍𝒂𝒘: an indicator variable that equals one if firm i is a voluntary clawback adopter and 0 otherwise; Ln(Total Assets): natural log of 
total assets; SalesGrowth: quarter-over-quarter increase in sales, on a per share basis; Leverage: total liabilities divided by book value 
of stockholders’ equity; Earnings Volatility: standard deviation of ROA over past 8 quarters; Loss: an indicator variable equal to 1 if 
earnings before extraordinary items for the quarter is negative and 0 otherwise; Market-to-book: price/(common equity/outstanding 
shares); SI: an indicator variable that equals one if firm reports a special item in quarter q and zero otherwise; Special Items: the 
amount of reported special items divided by total assets; Leverage: Total liabilities divided by book value of stockholders’ equity; 
Ln(Age): natural log of the number of years since the company first appeared in Compustat; Accrual: GAAP earnings less cash from 
operations divided by total assets; Restatement: an indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm restates its financial statement within prior 
two years and 0 otherwise; Restate_error: an indicator variable that accounting restatement is due to clerical errors, and 0 otherwise; 
Tech: an indicator variable that equals one if firm i is a high-tech industry as defined in Francis and Schipper (1999), and 0 otherwise; 
Big4: an indicator variable equal to 1 if a company hires a Big 4 auditor and 0 otherwise; %Outside: the percentage of outside 
directors on board; %Insider: the percentage of insiders’ shareholding; NonGAAPEarnings: I/B/E/S reported actual (basic) earnings 
per share; Non-GAAP equals 1 if a NonGAAPEarnings does not equal GAAPEarnings and zero otherwise. NonGAAPExclusions: 
Non-GAAP Earnings - GAAP Earnings. All continuous variables (with the exception of the lower bound of age) are winsorized at 1 






Panel B: Propensity Score Matching Results 
 














Total Assets 12916 12969 0.02  3594 3987 0.01 
Sales Growth 0.330 0.342 0.06 
 
0.301 0.202 -0.52 
Leverage 2.354 2.612 0.66 
 
1.405 1.286 -1.03 
Earnings Volatility 8.316 8.285 -0.70 
 
0.006 0.006 -0.35 
SI 0.713 0.660 -1.26 
 
1 1 -1.26 
Special Items -0.007 -0.007 0.15 
 
0.000 0 0.66 
Loss 0.202 0.235 0.87 
 
0 0 0.87 
Market-to-Book 2.930 3.161 0.72 
 
2.205 2.150 -1.19 
Ln(Age) 3.219 3.189 -0.64 
 
3.258 3.258 -0.98 
Accrual -0.099 -0.097 0.39 
 
-0.090 -0.092 -0.08 
Tech 0.231 0.255 0.63 
 
0 0 0.63 
Restatement 0.166 0.142 -0.75 
 
0 0 -0.75 
Big4 Auditor 0.874 0.895 0.70 
 
1 1 0.70 
%Outside 0.841 0.844 0.36 
 
0.875 0.875 0.27 
Insiderholding 0.078 0.078 0.03 
 
0.036 0.034 -0.04 
NonGAAP 0.765 0.741 -0.63 
 
1 1 -0.63 
FutureIncome 1.734 1.585 -0.63 
 
1.620 1.595 -0.45 
NonGAAPEarnings 0.461 0.445 -0.32 
 
0.450 0.440 -0.41 
NonGAAPExclusion 0.154 0.125 -0.53 
 
0.010 0 -1.27 
 





Panel C: Difference in Matched Propensity Scores 
N Mean 1% 25% 50% 75% 99% Std. Dev. 







Panel D: Hand-Collected Sample Composition (using press release data) 
Year Non-Adopters Clawback Adopters 
2006 16 16 
2007 58 58 
2008 60 60 
2009 54 54 
Total 188 188 
 
  
Panel E: Difference between Clawback Adopters and Non-Clawback Adopters 
(using press release data) 















test   
NonGAAP 0.369 0.390 0.60 
  
0 0 0.60 
 NonGAAPEarnings 0.557 0.498 -1.20 
  
0.44 0.43 -1.18 
 NonGAAPExclusion 0.029 0.035 0.26 
  
0 0 1.38 
 Fopi 2.044 2.092 0.32 
  
1.800 1.860 0.851 
 Total Assets 10,187 10,837 -0.36 
  
3,102 2,774 -1.66 * 
Sales Growth 0.562 0.407 -1.01 
  
0.443 0.371 -0.38 
 Leverage 1.604 1.798 0.86   1.218 1.190 -1.18  
Earnings Volatility 0.012 0.013 0.74 
  
0.007 0.008 1.19  
Loss 0.095 0.116 0.89   0 0 0.89  
Market-to-Book 2.970 3.097 0.61   2.417 2.302 -0.63  
Special Items 0.520 0.552 0.88   1 1 0.88  
Ln(Age) 4.020 4.019 -0.14 
  
4.025 4.025 -0.08 
 Accrual -0.023 -0.028 -1.43 
  
-0.026 -0.027 -0.91 
 Tech 0.228 0.226 -0.07   0 0 -0.07  
Restatement 0.130 0.118 -0.47   0 0 -0.47  
Big4  0.971 0.950 -1.43 
  
1 1 -1.43 
 %Outside 0.839 0.837 -0.30 
  
0.875 0.867 -0.76 
 %Insider 0.087 0.072 1.51 
  
0.033 0.037 1.69 * 










The Effect of Clawback Adoption on the Frequency of Non-GAAP Disclosure 
 
The sample period covers the first quarter of 2005 through the fourth quarter of 2010 (2005 Q1–2009 Q4).  
 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏�𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃 𝑞� = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑤 + 𝛼2𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 + 𝜶𝟑𝑨𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓 ∗ 𝑪𝒍𝒂𝒘 + 𝛼4𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑞 + 𝛼5𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑞 + 𝛼6𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑞
+ 𝛼7𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑞 + 𝛼8𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑞 + 𝛼8𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑞 + 𝛼10𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑞 + 𝛼11𝑆𝐼𝑞
+ 𝛼12𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑞 + 𝛼13𝐵𝑖𝑔𝑏𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑞 + 𝛼14𝑄𝑇𝑅4 + 𝛼15𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 +  𝜀𝑞  
 
(2) 
NonGAAP equals 1 if a firm discloses non-GAAP in the quarter and 0 if not; 𝑪𝒍𝒂𝒘: an indicator variable that equals one if firm i is voluntary 
clawback adopters and 0 otherwise; After: an indicator variable that equals one if the period q is after the clawback adoption among clawback 
adopters and 0 otherwise; Ln(Total Assets): a natural log of total assets; Intangibles: Intangible assets divided by total assets; Tech: an 
indicator variable that equals one if firm i is a high-tech industry as defined in Francis and Schipper (1999); Market-to-book: price/(common 
equity/outstanding shares); Sales Growth: quarter-over-quarter increase in sales, on a per share basis; Leverage: Total liabilities divided by 
book value of stockholders’ equity; Earnings Volatility: standard deviation of ROA over past 8 quarters; SI: an indicator variable that equals 
one if firm reports a special item in quarter q and zero otherwise; Special Items: the amount of reported special items; Bigbath: one if if a firm 
reports a negative special items and negative earnings in the same quarter; QTR4: an indicator variable for each quarter; Accruals: GAAP 
earnings less cash from operations; All continuous variables (with the exception of the lower bound of age) are winsorized at 1 percent and 99 
percent. *, **, *** indicate p-values of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
 
  Model 1   Model 2 
  





 Matched Sample 
 
 Coef   t-stat  
 
Coef   t-stat 
Intercept 𝛼0 -1.606 *** -3.54  𝛼0 -1.220 *** -3.88 
Claw  
   
 𝛼1 -0.218 * -1.87 
After 𝜶𝟏 0.245 * 1.78 
 𝛼2 -0.338 *** -2.84 
After*Claw  
   
 𝜶𝟑 0.505 *** 4.24 
Ln(Total Assets) 𝛼2 0.061   1.29 
 𝛼4 0.056   1.55 
Intangibles 𝛼3 1.618 *** 4.54 
 𝛼5 1.163 *** 4.29 
Tech 𝛼4 0.708 *** 4.92 
 𝛼6 0.701 *** 5.87 
Market-to-Book 𝛼5 0.000   0.01 
 𝛼7 0.034 ** 2.29 
SalesGrowth 𝛼6 -0.008   -0.49 
 𝛼8 -0.003   -0.24 
Leverage 𝛼7 -0.721 ** -2.08 
 𝛼9 -0.564 ** -2.21 
Earnings Volatility 𝛼8 11.624 *** 3.96 
 𝛼10 7.168 *** 3.16 
SI 𝛼9 0.992 *** 10.04 
 𝛼11 1.091 *** 14.32 
Bigbath 𝛼11 0.124   0.85 
 𝛼13 0.121   1.23 
Special Items 𝛼10 -0.002 *** -2.59 
 𝛼12 -0.002 *** -3.72 
QTR4 𝛼12 0.055   0.70 
 𝛼14 0.017   0.33 
Accrual 𝛼13 -1.212   -1.37 
 𝛼15 -0.979   -1.62 
 
      
   Year Fixed  Yes   Yes 
N  3,516   6,931 










TABLE 4  
The Effect of Clawback Adoptions on the Quality of Non-GAAP Exclusions 
 




=  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑞 + 𝛼2𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑤 + 𝛼3𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑞 + 𝛼4𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑞 + 𝛼5𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑤
× 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑞 + 𝛼6𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑞 × 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑞 + 𝛼7𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑞 × 𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑤 + 𝜶𝟖𝑨𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒒 × 𝑪𝒍𝒂𝒘
× 𝑵𝒐𝒏𝑮𝑨𝑨𝑷𝑬𝒙𝒄𝒍𝒖𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒒 + 𝛼9𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑞 + 𝛼10𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑞 + 𝛼11𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑞




FutureOperatingIncome: Earnings per Share from operations which is summed over four quarters starting from quarter q+1; 𝑪𝒍𝒂𝒘: an 
indicator variable that equals one if firm i is a voluntary clawback adopter and 0 otherwise; After: an indicator variable that equals one if the 
period q is after the voluntary clawback adoption and 0 otherwise; GAAP Earnings: basic EPS before extraordinary items and discontinued 
operations; NonGAAPEarnings: Non-GAAP earnings per share, as disclosed in firms’ quarterly earnings release; NonGAAPExclusions: 
NonGAAP Earnings - GAAP Earnings; Sales Growth: quarter-over-quarter increase in sales, on a per share basis; Ln(Total Assets): a natural 
log of total assets in quarter q; Earnings Volatility: standard deviation of return on assets over at least six of the previous eight quarters; Loss: 
an indicator variable equal to 1 if earnings before extraordinary items for the quarter is less than 0 and 0 otherwise; Market-to-book: 
price/(common equity/outstanding shares); Ln(Age): a natural log of the number of years since the company first appeared in Compustat; 
Accruals: GAAP earnings less cash from operations; All continuous variables (with the exception of the lower bound of age) are winsorized 




  Model 3   Model 4 
  
 Only  
Clawback Adopters     
Propensity-Score 
 Matched Sample 
 
 Coef   t-stat 
  
Coef   t-stat 
Intercept 𝛼0 -2.827 * -1.83 
 
𝛼0 -3.557 *** -2.74 
NonGAAPEarnings 𝛼1 1.654 *** 11.01 
 
𝛼1 1.648 *** 16.67 
Claw  
    
𝛼2 -0.030   -0.29 
After 𝛼2 0.018   0.19  𝛼3 0.012   0.11 
NonGAAPExclusions α3 -0.216 * -1.90 
 
𝛼4 -0.244 *** -3.32 
Claw*NonGAAPExclusion  
    
𝛼5 0.100   0.87 
After*NonGAAPExclusion 𝜶𝟒 -0.410 ** -2.26 
 
𝛼6 0.055   0.44 
(𝜶𝟑 + 𝜶𝟔) -0.627 *** -3.97      
After*Claw  
    
𝛼7 -0.006   -0.05 
After*Claw*NonGAAPExclusion  
    
𝜶𝟖 -0.485 ** -2.08 
(𝜶𝟒 + 𝜶𝟓 + 𝜶𝟔 + 𝜶𝟖)      -0.574 *** -3.31 
Sales Growth 𝛼5 0.097 *** 3.18 
 
𝛼9 0.023 ** 0.00 
Market to Book 𝛼6 0.040   1.61  𝛼10 0.012   0.74 
Ln(Total Assets) 𝛼7 0.298 *** 6.54  𝛼11 0.246 *** 7.20 
Earnings Volatility 𝛼8 -8.343 *** -4.35  𝛼12 -8.175 *** -4.03 
Loss 𝛼9 0.239   1.46  𝛼13 -0.115   -0.85 
Ln(Firm Age) 𝛼10 0.401   1.07 
 
𝛼14 0.719 ** 2.29 
Accrual 𝛼11 -3.444 *** -4.05 
 
𝛼15 -4.588 *** -5.67 
          
Year Fixed  Yes   Yes 
N  3,455 
  
6,781 








Net Operating Assets and the Quality of Non-GAAP Exclusions 
 




=  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑞 + 𝛼2𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑤 + 𝛼3𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑞 + 𝛼4𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑞 + 𝛼5𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑤
× 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑞 + 𝛼6𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑞 × 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑞 + 𝛼7𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑞 × 𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑤 + 𝜶𝟖𝑨𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒒 × 𝑪𝒍𝒂𝒘
× 𝑵𝒐𝒏𝑮𝑨𝑨𝑷𝑬𝒙𝒄𝒍𝒖𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒒 + 𝛼9𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑞 + 𝛼10𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑞 + 𝛼11𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑞
+ 𝛼12𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑞 + 𝛼13𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑞 + 𝛼14𝐿𝑛(𝐴𝑔𝑒)𝑞 + 𝛼15𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑞




FutureOperatingIncome: Earnings per Share from operation which is summed over four quarters starting from quarter q+1; 𝑪𝒍𝒂𝒘: an 
indicator variable that equals one if firm i is a voluntary clawback adopter and 0 otherwise; After: an indicator variable that equals one if the 
period q is after the voluntary clawback adoption and 0 otherwise; GAAP Earnings: basic EPS before extraordinary items and discontinued 
operations; NonGAAPEarnings: I/B/E/S reported actual (basic) earnings per share; NonGAAPExclusions: Non-GAAP Earnings - GAAP 
Earnings; Sales Growth: quarter-over-quarter increase in sales, on a per share basis; Ln(Total Assets): a natural log of total assets in quarter 
q; Earnings Volatility: standard deviation of return on assets over at least six of the previous eight quarters; Negative Surprise: an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if earnings before extraordinary items for the quarter is less than 0, and 0 otherwise; Market-to-book: price/(common 
equity/outstanding shares); Ln(Age): a natural log of the number of years since the company first appeared in Compustat; Accruals: GAAP 
earnings less cash from operations; All continuous variables (with the exception of the lower bound of age) are winsorized at 1 percent and 99 
percent. *, **, *** indicate p-values of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
 
 
   High NOA   Low NOA 
 
 Coef   t-stat 
 
Coef   t-stat 
Intercept 𝛼0 -4.846 *** -3.70 
 
-1.983   -1.16 
NonGAAPEarnings 𝛼1 1.658 *** 13.48 
 
1.726 *** 11.45 
Claw 𝛼2 -0.046   -0.39 
 
-0.020   -0.16 
After 𝜶𝟑 -0.003   -0.02  0.026   0.21 
NonGAAPExclusions 𝛼4 -0.344 *** -2.64 
 
-0.263 *** -3.00 
Claw*NonGAAPExclusion 𝛼5 0.142   0.90 
 
0.098   0.48 
After*NonGAAPExclusion 𝛼6 0.122   0.83 
 
0.040   0.21 
After*Claw 𝛼7 -0.046   -0.29 
 
-0.004   -0.03 
After*Claw*NonGAAPExclusion 𝜶𝟖 -0.636 ** -2.57 
 
-0.154   -0.56 
Sales Growth 𝛼9 0.084 *** 3.56 
 
0.089 *** 2.59 
Market to Book 𝛼10 0.007   0.33  0.017   0.98 
Ln(Total Assets) 𝛼11 0.267 *** 7.18 
 
0.216 *** 5.77 
Earnings Volatility 𝛼12 -9.095 *** -2.64 
 
-8.066 *** -4.26 
Loss 𝛼13 -0.253   -1.53 
 
0.106   0.65 
Ln(Firm Age) 𝛼14 0.968 *** 2.98 
 
0.395   0.95 
Accrual 𝛼15 -5.893 *** -6.37 
 
-2.517 *** -2.86 
         
Year Fixed  Yes  Yes 
N  3,817 
 
2,964 










TABLE 6  
The Meeting/Beating Analysts Forecast on the Quality of Non-GAAP Exclusions 
 




=  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑞 + 𝛼2𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑤 + 𝛼3𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑞 + 𝛼4𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑞 + 𝛼5𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑤
× 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑞 + 𝛼6𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑞 × 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑞 + 𝛼7𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑞 × 𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑤 + 𝜶𝟖𝑨𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒒 × 𝑪𝒍𝒂𝒘
× 𝑵𝒐𝒏𝑮𝑨𝑨𝑷𝑬𝒙𝒄𝒍𝒖𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒒 + 𝛼9𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑞 + 𝛼10𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑞 + 𝛼11𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑞
+ 𝛼12𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑞 + 𝛼13𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑞 + 𝛼14𝐿𝑛(𝐴𝑔𝑒)𝑞 + 𝛼15𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑞




FutureOperatingIncome: Earnings per Share from operation which is summed over four quarters starting from quarter q+1; 𝑪𝒍𝒂𝒘: an 
indicator variable that equals one if firm i is a voluntary clawback adopter and 0 otherwise; After: an indicator variable that equals one if the 
period q is after the voluntary clawback adoption and 0 otherwise; GAAP Earnings: basic EPS before extraordinary items and discontinued 
operations; NonGAAPEarnings: I/B/E/S reported actual (basic) earnings per share; NonGAAPExclusions: Non-GAAP Earnings - GAAP 
Earnings; Sales Growth: quarter-over-quarter increase in sales, on a per share basis; Ln(Total Assets): a natural log of total assets in quarter 
q; Earnings Volatility: standard deviation of return on assets over at least six of the previous eight quarters; Negative Surprise: an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if earnings before extraordinary items for the quarter is less than 0, and 0 otherwise; Market-to-book: price/(common 
equity/outstanding shares); Ln(Age): a natural log of the number of years since the company first appeared in Compustat; Accruals: GAAP 
earnings less cash from operations; All continuous variables (with the exception of the lower bound of age) are winsorized at 1 percent and 99 




 Missing Analysts’ 




 Coef   t-stat 
 
Coef   t-stat 
Intercept 𝛼0 -4.706 ** -2.53 
 
-2.931 ** -2.30 
NonGAAPEarnings 𝛼1 1.374 *** 11.79 
 
1.951 *** 12.47 
Claw 𝛼2 -0.040   -0.30 
 
-0.058   -0.51 
After 𝜶𝟑 0.020   0.14  -0.010   -0.07 
NonGAAPExclusions 𝛼4 -0.193 ** -2.26 
 
-0.857 *** -2.93 
Claw*NonGAAPExclusion 𝛼5 0.134   1.17 
 
0.096   0.27 
After*NonGAAPExclusion 𝛼6 -0.037   -0.23 
 
0.549   1.06 
After*Claw 𝛼7 -0.060   -0.41 
 
0.067   0.52 
After*Claw*NonGAAPExclusion 𝜶𝟖 -0.409 * -1.80 
 
-0.838   -1.40 
Sales Growth 𝛼9 0.102 *** 3.18 
 
0.062 ** 2.37 
Market to Book 𝛼10 0.012   0.58  0.023   1.52 
Ln(Total Assets) 𝛼11 0.251 *** 6.03 
 
0.219 *** 5.94 
Earnings Volatility 𝛼12 -7.412 *** -3.31 
 
-7.913 *** -3.02 
Loss 𝛼13 -0.243 * -1.90 
 
-0.522 ** -2.13 
Ln(Firm Age) 𝛼14 0.924 ** 1.96 
 
0.422   1.40 
Accrual 𝛼15 -6.237 *** -6.06 
 
-2.821 *** -3.26 
         
Year Fixed  Yes  Yes 
N  2,913 
 
3,732 











Interpretation of Hypothesis Test Results 
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